Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries:
Lessons from EU Support to Somalia
Emma Visman
(Full Text of ECDPM Working Paper Number 66, December 1997)
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This paper should be cited as:
Visman, E. 1998 Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from EU Support to Somalia
(ECDPM Working Paper 66). Maastricht: ECDPM.
Contents
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the following people for their comments during the preparation of this paper: Neville Bissemba, ACP Secretariat; Tom Dodd, ECHO; Paolo Dieci, CISP; Dr Karin von Hippel, UN Political Office for Somalia; Richard Hyde, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Sigurd Illing, DGVIII, European Commission; Renee Iltis, DGVIII, European Commission; Councillor Guido Larcher, Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Italy; Seifulaziz Milas, UNDP Somalia; Dee O’Connell, Save the Children (UK); Dr Thania Paffenholz, EC Somalia Unit; Elias Hapte-Selassie, Life and Peace Institute; Dave Smith, UK Department for International Development; Luciano Vecchi, MEP; and Alexandros Yannis, PhD candidate in International Relations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and former adviser to the European Commission Special Envoy to Somalia.
Summary
How does a donor country or organisation work with politically fragile countries? This question is growing in importance as some developing countries become trapped in a vicious circle of political instability or confront severe crises in governance. It is also a burning issue for the negotiation of a successor to the Lomé IV Convention. The European Union (EU) is keen to link future aid allocation to recipient country performance. EU calls for greater aid selectivity (in favour of "good performers") may lead to a further marginalisation of the most fragile economies. At a policy level, the challenge is to ensure that the people in these poor countries, who need assistance to escape the crisis conditions, are not penalised by a system that depends on "performance" criteria without paying sufficient attention to "needs" criteria. At a practical level, the challenges are to find sufficiently representative local interlocutors with whom to cooperate, and to stimulate the creation of environments that enable this cooperation to be effective.
Both the ACP and the EU recognise that the current Convention does not really offer a comprehensive set of strategies, mechanisms and procedures to deal with "dysfunctional" states. Where essential elements (article 5) of the Convention are violated, there is a clear need to find alternatives to the suspension of aid. The experience of past EU cooperation with "non-performing" states, such as Somalia, can be a useful source of inspiration in this search for alternatives.
This paper considers EU cooperation with Somalia, especially via the Lomé Convention. While it provides an overview of EU engagement prior to the collapse of the Barre regime, it focuses on ways in which the EU sought to respond to Somali needs after the outbreak of civil war in 1991 and in the continuing absence of central government. The paper shows how the EC assumed a leading role in setting up a Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), and how it participated in the elaboration of country-specific principles and criteria for allocating aid resources, developed political dialogue and direct relations with Somali bodies at various sub-national levels, and ventured into less traditional sectors such as disarmament, demobilisation and security sector reforms.
Some proposals that could usefully inform the current negotiation process for a successor Lomé IV agreement are presented. These include: Defining an agreed set of principles for assistance, improving political dialogue, making provision in the new Convention for countries that lack central authority or where governments are unable or unwilling to adhere to agreed ACP-EU principles, extending the partnership to non-state actors, identifying priority areas for effective engagement, and elaborating country specific frameworks for allocating resources and measuring performance.
Introduction
Despite heightened concerns over human rights abuses in the 1980's, in 1990 the EC was the largest multilateral donor to Somalia, while several EU Member States provided significant bilateral assistance, chiefly Italy. While pre-1990 international interests in Somalia were largely based on the country’s economic and strategic political position, the 1991-92 crisis in Somalia was seen as a test case for large-scale international humanitarian intervention.
In the period following the collapse of central government in 1991, the EC has been a major provider of multilateral aid to Somalia. Through the appointment of a Special Envoy from 1993 to 1997, the EC acted as a spokesperson for the international community and was instrumental in promoting increased cooperation through the establishment of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB).
The EU’s current engagement in Somalia may be justified by a number of concerns, including: the fulfilment of existing commitments within the Lomé Convention; the moral responsibility to meet humanitarian needs; the Union’s current commitment to enhance its support to national and regional peace-building and conflict management capacities, as well as the trade interests of a number of EU member states.
Somalia is unique in many ways. ‘No other society in the contemporary world has had to deal with such a prolonged period of state collapse’ (UNDP, 1998). It is also the first country where European Development Fund (EDF) resources have been allocated in the absence of a government, requiring that European Commission staff develop direct links with a range of Somali bodies at the local, district and regional levels.
In the absence of a national government, the international community has been required to develop a strategy for effective engagement within various geographical regions of Somalia experiencing differing levels of insecurity. The failure of the large-scale UN-led efforts in 1992-3 resulted in a significant withdrawal of international engagement in Somalia. Donors subsequently developed an approach promoting rehabilitation and development assistance in those areas where a sufficient level of security and Somali participation existed, while humanitarian needs are met in zones of continuing crises. These principles inform the EC’s allocation of resources, while the need to integrate peace-building throughout the Commission’s multi-sectoral engagement has been identified.
The draft mandates of both the European Commission and the ACP group for the current renegotiation of the Lomé Convention raise but do not tackle the issue of how relations with countries lacking a legitimate or internationally recognised central state are to be managed. Nor do they touch on the issue of how to ensure that the aid and trade concerns of Somalia are addressed in the current negotiations.
This case study is divided into three main components. The first section reviews the causes of the current situation in Somalia. The second section focuses on EU engagement with Somalia. The concluding section considers how the lessons learned from past and current EU relations with Somalia can inform the current renegotiation of future ACP-EU relations.
Reasons for Somalia’s 'Poor Performance'
As the situation in Somalia gradually deteriorated during the 1980's, the collapse of central government in 1991 was not unexpected. Lacking government support, the survival of public services became increasingly dependent on external assistance. The government had increasingly centralised its control of power and resources, leaving local and regional concerns largely unattended. It clamped down on demands for increased democratic reform and was prosecuting a civil war in the north. While Siad Barre’s repressive regime (1969-1991) incited widespread distrust of central government, his strategy of divide and rule left a legacy of deep inter-clan hostility and resulted in a number of clan-based insurgencies.
Somalia was of strategic interest during the Cold War and thus was well-furnished with arms. The USSR supported the country’s militarisation up to 1977, when it transferred its support to Ethiopia. The USA provided significant military assistance in the 1980's. Italy was a supporter of the Barre regime throughout this period, even up to his fall from power.
The Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977-78 and the influx of an estimated 1.3 million Ethiopian refugees, together with a series of severe droughts in 1974-5, 1977, 1979-80, 1984 and 1987, had severe repercussions. With the national economy largely dependent on stock rearing, the country was particularly affected by the imposition of a 1983 ban on the import of Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia, due to reports of rinderpest in East Africa.
In the early 1980's, Somalia could boast ‘the lowest GNP, the lowest physical quality of life index, the lowest per capita public education expenditure, the highest infant mortality per 1,000 births, and the highest per capita military expenditure’ (UNDP, 1998).
Since then, the civil war and ongoing insecurity have exacerbated the situation, resulting in Somalia being ranked lowest in the 1996 Human Development Index. According to Somalia’s first national human development report released by UNDP in 1998, the average life-expectancy is 43 years. Only 17 per cent of adults are literate and the mortality rate for children under five is 25 per cent. "Somalia’s prolonged humanitarian crisis has raised the threshold for what is considered an emergency there - only outright famine conditions and epidemics generate a humanitarian response" (UNDP, 1998). Now, with the combination of flood, droughts and chronic insecurity, famine once again looms in areas of southern Somalia.
The current situation in Somalia exhibits considerable regional and local variation, with various dysfunctions manifest in the social, economic and political spheres.
It is estimated that up to 300,000 people died in the violence and conflict-induced famine of 1991-2, and up to 1.7 million people, roughly one fifth of the entire population, were displaced either internally or to neighbouring countries in the region.
With insecurity prevalent within the south, many have moved to the safer north-east region where internally displaced are already estimated to comprise one third of the current population. As those who took refuge in neighbouring countries begin to return, many also choose to settle, at least temporarily, in those areas that provide greater security and better economic opportunity. Of the 240,000 refugees registered in Ethiopia at the end of 1997, 85,000 are expected to be repatriated by the end of 1998 and the remainder by 2000 (Tola, 1998a). At the end of 1997, a further 150,000 Somali refugees were in Kenya, 53,000 in Yemen, 20,000 in Djibouti and 3,000 in Eritrea. There were also estimated to be 200,000 internally displaced people, not including those affected by the floods in late 1997.
As a central organising force in Somali society, the clan structure has been able to exploit existing social concerns. It is, however, important to recognise that lineage identity co-exists with a range of other affiliations - professional, regional, class, factional, and religious (including the Islamist Al-Ittihad organisation) - in Somalia’s highly fluid political arena. Clan identity is itself fluid: lineage links can be realigned, rediscovered, or shifted to different levels of ancestry according to the situation. Furthermore, before the two Somali states merged in 1960, Somali people had lived in five separate territories - Djibouti (French Somaliland), Ogaden and Haud in Ethiopia, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya with different language and system of administration.
There are also pronounced variations within communities. The make-up of households and spread of family members have considerably altered as a result of the war. Although efforts which seek to re-establish social control are ongoing, many young men were deprived of education and have become used to earning their respect and livelihood through the use of arms. This group has also become increasingly reliant on the use of qat, the stimulant leaf grown in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia.
Foreign aid to Somalia averaged $459 m per year between 1984 and 1989. 'For Somalis, ideas of international aid were shaped by the experience of the 1980's when aid poured unabated into Somalia, right into the pockets of government officials' (Smith, 1996). During the 1980's, there were, for example, continual discrepancies between the Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over the numbers of Ethiopian refugees present in Somalia as a result of the Ogaden war, with the figures determining the amount of this important source of external assistance. The extremely visible, high-tech resources which accompanied the large-scale humanitarian intervention of 1992-3 merely exacerbated this misperception of aid.
Prior to 1991, there were few established national NGOs. Since then, the need to build a sense of ownership of rehabilitation projects amongst the local community has increasingly been recognised. While absent in some areas of initial service provision, there has been increased focus on developing appropriate mechanisms of community management of resources, including water committees, and systems of cost-recovery to ensure the sustainability of services, including education and health.
While in 1981 the country embarked on a series of stabilisation and adjustment programmes with the IMF, these were subject to constant renegotiation as the economic situation deteriorated. Somalia broke with the IMF in September 1987 and in May 1988 was declared ineligible for further borrowing due to accrued arrears. External debt reached $2,350 m in 1990, or over 281% of the country's GNP.
Efforts to control prices led to an increase in parallel trading, while the lifting of price controls resulted in soaring inflation, reaching 82% in 1988 and an estimated 200 per cent in 1990. Salaries for public employees did not keep pace with inflation and work attendance deteriorated markedly.
While some observers point to the relative ‘boom’ in Somalia’s economy in the period since 1993, this has been restricted to certain areas (particularly the north-west and the export of livestock) and has predominantly benefited certain groups and individuals. However, even prior to 1991, the need for economic diversification was clearly emerging. While stock rearing accounted for 49 per cent of GDP and well over 80 per cent of the goods exported in 1988, already in 1987, it was estimated that the national herd was approaching the limit of the range carrying capacity.
As well as causing widespread infrastructural devastation, the civil conflict has also resulted in the transfer of valuable assets, including access to land and trade routes. This has led to trade wars and, in some cases, armed conflict, as has occurred in the struggle over the control of the production and export of bananas, which formerly comprised 40% of export revenues.
Trade has suffered from the lack of international representation and recognised national institutions required to meet the increasing number of trade regulations. For example, while the livestock trade was gaining strength in north-west Somalia/Somaliland, the Saudi Government once again instituted a ban on Somali livestock on 7 February 1998 due to reports of Rift Valley fever in East Africa. It is estimated that this will cut livestock earnings by half in 1998. A recent FAO assessment concluded that the risk of infection being transmitted by livestock originating in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia had returned to the low levels prior to the 1997 outbreak, and both the World Health Organisation and concerned donors are encouraging the Saudi authorities to reconsider their policy. The development of Somalia’s potential to export fish will similarly require the capacity to meet international trading regulations.
The Somali population lacks internationally recognised representation. It is also extremely difficult to be sure of the representativeness of any group, whether at the local, district, regional or national level.
While Somaliland declared independence in May 1991 and has recently developed relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, the international community has not provided international recognition. In the absence of such recognition and under pressure to remain part of the countrywide reconciliation process, Somaliland appears to have softened the tone of its claims to independence. A conference in north-east Somalia in July 1998 established the Puntland state, an administrative region which does not seek independence and remains part of greater Somalia. While nascent administrations have been proclaimed in other regions, including Jubaland, Hiraan and Benadiir, these have been declared in a top-down fashion and it is unclear if they will remain.
With the exception of the approach of the first Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador Sahnoun, UNOSOM’s efforts in the 1992-3 period, as well as the series of ongoing high-level peace conferences, have largely sought to establish a centralised, internationally recognisable form of government. This has played into the hands of the factional ‘warlords’ and their search for national and international recognition, resulting in a mushrooming of factions, many created since the fall of central government.
Since 1993, political resolution has increasingly sought to support inclusive forms of local governance. Elders and traditional leaders have been accorded improved standing in those areas enjoying greater security, such as the north-west and north-east of the country. Likewise, the potential for women as peacebrokers has received greater recognition and efforts made to support their position within the community.
Lacking international representation, Somalia is reliant on other states to defend its interests. There has been no clear international response to Ethiopia’s engagement in areas of southern and central Somalia, nor regulation of the exploitation of its rich fishery resources. Likewise there is no Somali representative within the ACP Group to protect Somalia’s national interests and engage in discussion on the renegotiation of future ACP-EU relations, nor within discussions ongoing within other international bodies which are likely to have an impact on Somalia’s potential for development.
The international community has had considerable difficulties in engaging with a state that lacks a central government. While a variety of mechanisms have been developed to deal with governments which are considered unrepresentative or do not adhere to human rights, donors have rarely been obliged to create mechanisms with which to deal solely and directly with non-state bodies.
The Past EU Response
While this case study focuses on EC response in the post-1991 period, the first part of this section provides a brief overview of EU engagement in the period prior to the collapse of central government and the outbreak of civil war. It should be noted that Commission documentation for this period has suffered due to the loss or destruction of many records when the delegation office in Mogadishu was closed in January 1991.
Somalia received 72 mecu under the pre-1976 Treaty of Rome and two Yaoundé Conventions, all channelled through national indicative programmes (NIPs). 76.4 mecu was allocated under the first Lomé Convention (1976-80), with the largest part of non-programmable aid provided as emergency aid, including a component for drought rehabilitation.
Under the second Lomé Convention (1981-1985), Somalia was allocated 97.5 mecu, with a much smaller percentage, 57 mecu, allocated through the NIP and almost 31 mecu disbursed through non-programmable funds. Of the latter, the largest part was again channelled to emergency aid to support the estimated 1.3 million refugees from Ethiopia, while over 3.5 mecu was provided through Stabex to support the export of bananas and livestock/animal products.
Under the third Lomé Convention (1986-1995), Somalia was allocated over 147 mecu, of which 121.5 mecu was channelled through the NIP. NIP financing of sectoral import programmes proved crucial during Somalia’s increasing shortage of foreign currency in 1988, while NIP funds were also channelled through the EC’s Debt Relief for Sub-Saharan Countries.
While the European Community continued to fund programmes in Somalia up to the fall of the Barre government, the EC’s recently established First and Second Rehabilitation Programmes have been financed by unspent funds from Lomé II and III, indicating the difficulties experienced in programming resources during the 1980's.
Indeed, the European Parliament called on ‘the Commission to establish whether, in light of the present situation, the existing forms of cooperation between Somalia and the European Community can contribute to the objectives defined in the Lomé Convention’ and urged ‘the Commission and the Member States to make all cooperation with the Somali Government conditional on genuine and proven respect for human rights and on democratization of the country’ (European Parliament, 1990).
However, there appeared to be little coherence in the response of EU Member States to the evolving situation in Somalia. By 1987, Italian bilateral assistance had risen to $232.5 m, at which point Italy provided nearly 40 per cent of Somalia’s total aid receipts and more than half of its bilateral aid. The United States and Germany also contributed significant, although varying, amounts of bilateral aid during the 1980’s.
Amid growing concerns over the rising level of insecurity and reports of human rights abuses by the Barre government, the amounts of bilateral assistance from EU Member States decreased towards the end of the 1980's. Nevertheless, the pressure exerted by the powerful Italian banana lobby maintained Italy as by far the largest bilateral donor even through the last months of the Barre government, resulting in the provision of over $111m in 1990.
Following the collapse of central government, the EC supported the efforts of the UN, and Ambassador Sahnoun in particular, to re-establish legitimate government through a process of consultation. However, despite continued support for UN-initiated efforts to resolve the ongoing crisis, even in 1992 the European Parliament noted 'the failure of some of the UN agencies concerned to cooperate effectively' (European Parliament, 1992b).
The events of 1993, especially the killing of Pakistani and US troops serving with the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the subsequent series of retaliatory actions, led to open questioning of the UN strategy, whose efforts had been undermined by 'the lack of clear political objectives to be pursued and the lack of coherence of the means used' (European Parliament, 1994).
The 1993 Addis Ababa declaration (see annex 1) identified conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation aid, called for strengthened coordination of international engagement, and led to the creation of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The EC is also a member of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), a group of donors which supports the activities of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Following the extension of IGAD’s mandate in 1996 to encompass conflict prevention, management and resolution, the IPF has established sub-committees to address the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.
The IPF met in Italy on 19 and 20 November 1998, where discussion within the sub-Committee on Somalia centred on the newly-formed Standing Committee. Set up in Addis Ababa in October 1998, the 15-member committee includes representatives from all countries and regional organisations which have been most concerned with initiatives to resolve the conflict in Somalia.
With significant potential for increased coordination in the international community’s strategy towards Somalia, the Standing Committee is currently undertaking a joint mission to assess if assistance can usefully be channelled to the newly-established regional administrations. Most important, the Committee includes both Egypt and Ethiopia, which, until this recent initiative, were leading parallel peace processes, but are now seeking a common position on Somalia.
The EC Special Envoy for Somalia was appointed in June 1993 with a mandate to re-establish the EC's Delegation. He took a leading role in establishing the SACB in February 1994 and, following the departure of UNOSOM II in March 1995 and the gradual retreat of international actors, the EC took an more prominent role in international involvement in Somalia. Through its position as chair of the Executive Committee of SACB, the EC became spokesperson for the international community and a principal reference point for EU Member States (von Hippel and Yannis, 1997). Indeed the visible commitment of the EC Special Envoy to promoting the needs of their country led some Somalis to consider the EC Special Envoy as an honorary representative of Somalia.
The SACB adopted the Addis Ababa Declaration as a basis for international engagement in Somalia. The Declaration ‘emphasised that although essential emergency assistance would remain unconditional, peace and security as well as adequate Somali participation would be prerequisites for reconstruction and rehabilitation’ (Illing, 1996). Through its 1995 Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance and 1997 Strategy on Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia, the conditions in the Addis Ababa Declaration were refined to develop the ‘peace dividend approach.’ The aim is to ‘ensure that international assistance is not only relevant to local efforts for reconstruction but also to peace building’ (see annex 3).
While the 1995 Code also establishes rules for the conduct of agencies working in Somalia (see annex 2), the 1997 strategy proposes that the level of the Somali contribution (human and financial resources, contributions in kind) to aid programmes should increase substantially and so begin to move away from aid dependency and towards sustainable recovery (see annex 3).
While the restructuring of the SACB in February 1996 confirmed the leading role entrusted to the EC, with the termination of the position of EC Special Envoy in the latter half of 1997, the chair of the Executive Committee of SACB was subsequently assumed by the Italian Delegation. While the newly appointed Counsellor of the EC Somalia Unit has now retaken the chair, the position of Counsellor is not equivalent to Special Envoy, and the Somalia Unit remains under the overall direction of the Delegate for Somalia and Kenya. Although it remains a member of all the major international political fora on Somalia, the EC is now more focused on development cooperation rather than the broader political remit undertaken by the former Special Envoy.
Following the fall of the Barre government and the outbreak of civil war, the EC Delegation in Somalia was closed in 1991. Nevertheless, the EC was swift to respond to emerging humanitarian needs. At the end of April 1991, an EC-funded daily flight from Nairobi was the only regular supply of aid. From 1991-3, the EC assistance was almost exclusively humanitarian aid and emergency food aid (ecu 85 million) from the EC budget (European Commission, 1993).
From 1992, the European Parliament requested that the Council seek ways of releasing unspent funds reserved for Somalia under Lomé II and III, amounting to some 100 mecu (European Parliament, 1992a and 1992c), as well as proposing that resources allocated for Somalia under the Lomé IV Convention be made available.
Within the framework of the Special Initiative for Africa, and through the development of a new set of rules and regulations enabling the release of unspent funds allocated to Somalia under earlier Lomé Conventions, Somalia became the first country where EDF funds were released in the absence of a government. The DGVIII Commissioner took on the role of the National Authorising Officer (NAO).
The First Rehabilitation Programme (FRP) of 38 mecu, was approved in January 1994, although project activities did not start until June. The programme included support for rural development, institutional reconstruction, creation of employment, social sectors, physical infrastructure, technical assistance and zonal offices. Additional support was provided from EC budget lines for rehabilitation, food aid, human rights and democracy and emergency aid.
Rehabilitation activities focused on areas where there was some form of effective local authority and which met the conditions of the 1993 Addis Ababa Declaration, estimated to include some 60-70% of the country. Humanitarian assistance was provided within zones of continuing crisis. The principal implementors were international NGOs and UN agencies, while private contractors have also been involved in a number of EC-funded projects. Difficulties were encountered in the initial allocation of FRP resources, due in part to a paucity of international organisations (and the high turnover of expatriate staff) as well as a shortage of representative local counterparts. The FRP budget was therefore restructured and the programme period, originally envisaged for a one-year period, extended to two and a half years. A mid-term evaluation of this programme was carried out in 1997.
The Second Rehabilitation Programme (SRP) of July 1996 was allocated 47 million, again financed through unspent Lomé funds. The programme continues to develop support to those sectors identified within the FRP, while additional assistance is once more provided through specific EC budget lines. ECHO also provided an additional 2 mecu in response to the devastating floods of 1997.
Given the situation prior to 1991, it is clear that Somalia is not merely faced with reconstruction, but with the creation of an entirely new form of governance. The EC has been instrumental in seeking to support the development of more inclusive forms of governance, and developing principles for articulation with authorities emerging at the regional, district and local levels. Within the FRP for example, support was provided to develop decentralised political structures.
The London School of Economics produced a "Menu of Options" for decentralised governance (see box 1). These were discussed within a series of seminars in which a wide range of Somali civil society were represented.
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Box 1: A Menu of Options for Decentralised Political Structures in Somalia
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In 1995, the report by the London School of Economics described four models of decentralised constitutional government that may be appropriate for Somalia. The four models were: (1) a confederation; (2) a federation; (3) a decentralised unitary state with strong guarantees of local of regional autonomy; and (4) a consociational, non-territorially based form of decentralisation. The report then looked at different elements of government in modern democracies, such as political economy, the administration, the judiciary, defence and foreign relations, and electoral designs, and outlined how each would be organised in the different models. To enable widespread dissemination of the study, a Somali translation of the executive summary was produced, while the EC sponsored two seminars in Kenya to enable traditional and religious leaders, intellectuals, professionals, women and other representatives of Somali civil society to discuss the study in greater detail. The constitutional debate launched by the study provided a forum for Somali civil society to contribute to the political debate. It also promoted the development decentralised political structures that were supported by seminar participants. |
Source: Summary of A study of decentralised political structures for Somalia: A menu of options. London School of Economics and Political Science, Commissioned by the EU/EC Somalia Unit, with the assistance of UNDOS, August 1995, and p 16-17, The European Commission in Somalia, 1993-1996, Helping Rebuild Somalia.
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The SRP includes a peace-building and reconciliation component. Funded from the EC human rights and democracy budget line, the EC has supported civic education programmes run by the Life and Peace Institute, and two pilot demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Assessments have recently been conducted to consider the potential for EC support to demobilisation efforts in north-west Somalia/Somaliland and the north-east/Puntland (Leber, 1998).
Despite Somalia being unable to ratify Lomé IV, due to its lack of a signatory government, in November 1995, a new Article 364A was incorporated into the revised text. This amendment ensures that, in the event of the formation of an internationally recognised government, Somalia will be able to accede to Lomé IV and have access to the funds of the 8th EDF.
While existing funds are considered sufficient to support EC engagement to 2000, it remains unclear how funds will be assured for Somalia in the event that unspent funds from earlier Lomé Conventions are exhausted prior to the establishment of an internationally recognised government. Somalia does not have a representative within the ACP Group and, within the current renegotiation of the Lomé Convention, the negotiating mandates of neither the Commission nor the ACP states have made particular provision for the country’s current situation.
With regard to the trade preferences included within the Convention, and in particular the banana protocol, Italy has again begun to import bananas from Somalia. However, the conflict in the south, where the majority of banana plantations are situated, has prevented utilisation of the country’s full quota, leading Italian export companies to seek compensation from the EC. Furthermore, under proposed revisions to the banana protocol which are due to take effect from the beginning of 1999, the country quota system will be ended. Instead the ACP Group will be allocated a global quota, which will then need to be divided among the ACP banana-producing countries. Lacking representation within the ACP, this will clearly place Somalia’s quota at risk.
More generally, as clearly demonstrated within the current Saudi ban on Somali livestock, the ability of Somalia to develop fish exports to the EC and other international markets clearly requires the development of the required certification for meeting trade regulations.
There was a distinct lack of coordination in the response of the international community to the situation in Somalia in 1991-2. With a small number of international NGOs and national counterparts operational in the prevailing insecurity, UN reticence to engage earned considerable disrespect. This disrespect was heightened by their lack of leadership and failure to develop an appropriate strategy, and the incoherence in policies demonstrated between the various pillars of UNOSOM activity, with the political and military sides unwilling to be guided by the humanitarian sector.
Indeed, the failure of UNOSOM’s efforts to create the mechanisms required for effective in-country collaboration is probably one of the reasons why the EC assumed the lead within the SACB. Besides chairing the SACB, the EC Somalia Unit has supported the body’s coordination activities by financing a Health Coordinator for the Health Committee and an NGO deputy chair in the Sectoral Steering Committee.
While the SACB has provided a mechanism for coordination at the policy level and amongst donors, questions have been raised as to its efficacy in strengthening operational coordination. Furthermore, there have been disputes between and among some of the principle actors (namely the EC and the UN, as well as among the UN agencies themselves). Nevertheless, the EC continues to fund some activities of the UN, including the Food Security Assessment Unit, a joint EC/USAID/WFP initiative, the UNDP Somali Rural Rehabilitation Programme (SRRP) and UNCTAD’s work on the rehabilitation of Bossasso’s police station, rehabilitation centre and regional administration office.
Coordination between the EC and EU Member States takes place at a number of levels. The approach adopted within the EC’s FRP has led other EU donors, including the Netherlands and Italy to co-finance projects with the Commission, and meetings between the EC and EU Member States in Nairobi outside the SACB framework are planned. Within efforts to promote increased coordination between the EC and EU member states, the Commission has introduced country strategy papers. While a country strategy for Somalia was developed in 1997, the 1998 strategy has yet to be finalised. It should, however, be noted that EU member states have differing strategies towards Somalia. UK bilateral assistance is, for example, currently limited to the provision of humanitarian aid, while some Netherlands support is tied to the repatriation of refugees in north-east Somalia.
Reactions of a number of EU member states to the proactive role of the EC have been mixed. The EC Special Envoy was not originally intended to be a political spokesperson for the EU. However, in his words ‘if we often had to deal with political issues, it was not because we wanted to politicise aid, but because any serious involvement in Somalia is closely connected to the political environment’ (Illing, 1997). While a number of EU member state ambassadors responsible for relations with Somalia were very supportive of the role of the Special Envoy, within the Commission’s administrative restructuring, the position was ended in 1997.
Although the prominent role of the EC Special Envoy in Somalia may be seen as a unique response to a unique situation, within the EU’s commitment to strengthen its Common Foreign and Security Policy, it remains unclear whether the Commission wishes to develop increased political initiative, and whether the EU member states wish to see it do so.
Furthermore, several EU member states have questioned the value of the SACB, perceiving it as a group of donors telling other donors what to do, and lacking representative Somali participation. Some international donors have specifically questioned the ‘peace dividend approach’, and whether international engagement is really a sufficient incentive to develop or promote increased stability. Others have questioned whether regional allocation of resources according to perceived levels of stability is an equitable or effective criterion for international engagement. Perhaps of greatest importance, concerns have been raised as to whether current efforts to stabilise the situation may ‘normalise’ the conflict-induced population movements and transfer of assets and make the subsequent redress of injustices committed more difficult.
Indeed, as occurred after the disastrous events of 1993, the question is again being raised within both the Commission and EU member states as to whether non-intervention is at present the most effective way to promote resolution of the conflict in Somalia, while acknowledging the dilemma this raises with regard to the moral responsibility to ensure that humanitarian needs are met. At present, therefore, the problem may be less one of coordination of conflicting interests of the various international actors, and rather one of diminishing interest in the long-term rehabilitation of Somalia.
While the EC and the EU Member States review their policies towards Somalia, there appears to have been little attempt to develop a strategy for the Horn and Somalia’s role within the region. Given that Ethiopia is the largest recipient of EC aid, the EU needs to clarify its policy towards Ethiopian engagement on Somali territory, particularly in light of Somalia’s lack of international representation. When developing a strategy for the rehabilitation of Somalia’s trading facilities, the impact of the current crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea also demands a regional perspective.
Improving the Response to Poor Performance: Options for Future EU Support
In its relations with Somalia since 1993, the EC has taken an important leadership role, enabling increased collaboration within the international community, as well as fostering the development of principles for providing rehabilitation assistance and humanitarian aid. While EU Member States have reacted differently to the leading role adopted by the EC, the following seven lessons from EU-Somalia cooperation can usefully inform discussions on future ACP-EU relations.
The ACP mandate recognises the need to reach agreement on 'measurable standards or verifiable indicators' for the current provisions on democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance already included within the existing Convention (ACP Group, 1998b). While the Commission’s mandate refers to the need to promote a democratic and sustainable environment within ACP countries, these issues are covered in greater depth in the Commission's Communication on Democratisation (European Commission, 1998b).
Agreement by both the ACP and the EU on the precise content and interpretation of the fundamental principles on which ACP-EU partnership is to be based is necessary to subsequently develop country-specific criteria for allocating resources and for measuring performance.
Since 1993, EC rehabilitation assistance to Somalia has been provided on the basis of an internationally agreed set of principles (the 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement, the 1995 Code of Conduct and the 1997 Strategy). Engagement in areas of Somalia that fail to meet these conditions is limited to the provision of humanitarian aid. The ‘peace dividend approach’ which the SACB has developed in its engagement with Somalia has become the underlying principle that the EC has sought to integrate within all forms of development cooperation. This includes making the existence of stability a criteria for the allocation of resources. This approach clearly informs the European Commission’s desire that the ACP-EU partnership contributes to ‘peace and stability throughout the world’ (European Commission, 1998a).
EC engagement in Somalia has also to some degree foreseen the Commission’s desire for a future partnership to be based on the principles of ‘fulfilment of mutual obligations’ and ‘ownership’ (European Commission, 1998a). While the SACB 1995 Code recognises the need to specify the obligations of both the providers as well as the beneficiaries of development cooperation, the 1997 strategy identifies the need for a substantial Somali contribution to aid programmes as a condition for the provision of rehabilitation and development assistance.
In their respective mandates for renegotiating the Lomé Convention, both the European Commission and the ACP have highlighted the need for increased political dialogue. Concerns have been expressed about the imposition of conditionalities, and the ACP mandate states that ACP-EU dialogue should continue to prioritise the objective of development, and that this must not be subordinated to 'political objectives or other agendas'.
Also recognised is the need to review the breadth of issues on which political dialogue is to take place. For example, within their draft mandates, the European Commission and the ACP identify the need for conflict prevention to be included within the political dimension of the future agreement, including discussion on human rights and the impact of military spending on development. As noted above, peace-building is both a fundamental principle and a criteria for the allocation of EC aid to Somalia.
If the Commission is to fulfil its aim of developing a genuine partnership, replacing the concept of "conditionality" with that of "contract", the EU needs to include, within the ACP-EU dialogue, those areas of EU activity which, although outside a future agreement, will impact on the ACP. In the case of Somalia, this would include such areas as fishing resources and dumping of toxic waste by EU-registered companies. Dealing with issues identified as of importance within ACP-EU relations, including concerns over trade and debt relief, will also require joint action in other international fora.
While there is a clear wish on the part of both the EU and the ACP to deepen the political dialogue within future ACP-EU relations, EU Member States need to clarify how they foresee the role of the European Commission in this process. While Somalia may be seen as a unique situation, demanding new forms of engagement, it also provides a context in which to consider the possibilities and constraints for developing the EC’s potential to undertake a more political role.
The lack of central government in Somalia has obliged the Commission to develop its relations with a range of bodies throughout the country. Through the SACB, the EC Special Envoy clearly played an important role in galvanising cooperation among the international community, in both the provision of development cooperation as well as through a political response to the evolving situation in Somalia. Cooperation between the EC and EU Member States took place at other levels including through the co-financing of projects, the development of the Commission’s orientation and strategy in Somalia and the initiation of meetings between the EC and EU Member States outside of the SACB framework. Moreover, it has been recognised that the constitutional debate that the EC launched in Somalia also reflects the increasing demand that the EC be more assertive in promoting democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights through development cooperation (European Commission, 1997).
Although the impact of the discontinuation of the position of EC Special Envoy on EC development cooperation with Somalia has yet to be assessed, a recent evaluation of EC cooperation in Liberia highlighted the fact that lack of political representation very much limited the potential for EC engagement (APT Consult UK, 1998). While EU Member States have agreed to establish the PPEWU, they have not clarified how they wish to further develop the CFSP, and particularly the roles to be played by the Commission and its country Delegations.
If it is to play a useful political role, the Commission will also need to remain flexible and to identify how it might best complement existing fora for coordination within any particular situation. With regard to Somalia, for example, while the SACB has proved useful in supporting increased donor coordination in the provision of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, the IGAD framework provides an important mechanism for wider political dialogue and coordination. This model could usefully be incorporated within a future partnership agreement to facilitate engagement and promote prevention of violent conflict in circumstances of similar state collapse.
Neither the current nor proposed future forms of ACP-EU partnership provide for the release of funds to countries that lack an internationally recognised signatory government. While in the extreme case of complete state collapse, the creation of new regulations has enabled Somalia to benefit from unspent Lomé funds, it is critical that the funding is continued, pending the establishment of an internationally recognised government. Since this may take a number of years, the ACP and EU will need to develop mechanisms to ensure that any future Convention incorporates mechanisms for cooperation in case an accepted signatory government has still not emerged. This would include consideration of how the EU should proceed in countries lacking a central government. In Somalia, the role of the NAO was taken on by the DGVIII Commissioner, and the EC has developed relations with national and local non-state actors and authorities.
Should the difficulties in developing the required regulations within a future agreement prove to be insurmountable, an alternative and temporary possibility is to make a special provision for Somalia in the EC budget. However, if a future Somali government is to be able to enjoy the benefits of a future ACP-EU agreement, the clause enabling this needs to be incorporated in a future agreement.
Genuine partnership will also require that the EU and ACP protect the rights of ACP Member States when they lack international representation. This currently means ensuring that Somalia’s concerns are considered in all developments that would impact on the country’s social, economic and political interests. This means making sure that Somalia’s interests are represented in the renegotiation of the banana protocol and regulation of EU-registered business, and also willingness to take up cases where unregulated non-EU engagement may be exacerbating existing tensions.
The fact that Somalia lacks a central government clearly differentiates it within the ACP. Nevertheless, as occurred in Somalia prior to 1991, there are other ACP countries where there are difficulties in ensuring that the implementation of EU development cooperation fulfils the principles on which Lomé is based.
It is clear that within proposals to increase political dialogue, there is a need to clarify the response in cases where governments are either unable or unwilling to meet the agreed principles. Clearly, in these two situations, the response may differ. Where governments are unable to meet agreed principles, assistance is needed to tackle the issue that constrain current capacity, including debt relief or promotion of new areas of economic development. Regarding governments that are unwilling to meet agreed principles, rather than automatically withdrawing aid, it may be better to explore alternative forms of engagement. These might include working more closely with local or regional authorities and strengthening the capacity of civil society, or developing alternative funding mechanisms required to ensure that the populations of such countries are not adversely affected (European Commission, 1998b).
While the difficulties of ensuring representation in the absence of a national government are discussed below, the identification of representative non-state partners may be equally difficult in countries with governments which are unable or unwilling to prioritise national concerns and which lack a strong civil society.
Within the current negotiations, there are proposals to extend the EC-ACP partnership within both the dialogue as well as the implementation of development cooperation. While in some ACP countries, the inclusion of new actors in the ACP-EU partnership will be greatly facilitated by the existence of national NGO platforms and chambers of commerce, the situation in Somalia is vastly different.
The EC has developed a dialogue with non-state actors at the local and regional levels in Somalia. However, this has entailed an assessment of the representative nature of potential partners as well as considering how to engage with local authorities without according international recognition to them. Given the lack of well-established national NGOs prior to 1991, and that many of the organisations subsequently established are seen as channels to access international funds or to link certain business concerns and faction leaders, it is difficult to ensure objective and appropriate representation from Somali civil society. As stated within a recent memorandum from international NGOs working in Somalia, the ‘search for local interlocutors is ideally based on the criteria of reliability and representativeness and also on the analysis of the functions and the interests represented by these interlocutors in the Somali context’ (VOICE, 1998).
The need to assess whether non-state groups are representative arises whether there is a government or not. The development of manageable systems for the inclusion of representative non-state actors within the development of both national and regional strategies for development cooperation requires willingness to promote well-informed political analysis within the Commission’s services and country delegations.
Both the European Commission and the ACP group have identified the need for increased delegation of decision-making to EC country delegations. Partnership with an extended group of actors will also require additional capacity within the delegations, particularly if such actors are to be involved in both formulating and implementation of EC development cooperation.
As the EC Somalia Unit has discovered, building relations with an extended group of actors requires that delegation staff extend their capacity for dialogue with and support for potential partners, as well as their ability to manage smaller grants. The selection and training of delegation personnel needs to include appropriate technical expertise as well as understanding of how all areas of engagement may contribute to the Commission’s objective of building peace and stability.
Furthermore, EC assistance is predominantly channelled through EC NGOs and international agencies, and the lack of experienced organisations and staff willing to work in the insecure environment has constrained the EC’s engagement in Somalia. A number of EC-funded activities in Somalia have been implemented by contractors, and this is also an area recommended for further consideration within a recent evaluation of EC support to rehabilitation.
In developing strategies for effective engagement, there is a need to identify the priority areas within a specific country, while ensuring due consideration of the wider regional context within which engagement takes place, and to examine how best these areas may be addressed and the potential actors of implementation.
Somalia is a case in point. The country still has a wide range of pressing needs, of both an immediate as well as a longer-term nature. While humanitarian needs require urgent address, the new government of Somalia, regardless of the form it takes, faces a number of major structural challenges. Building 'structural stability' so that it supports the country’s sustainable social and economic development, requires that hot issues are addressed. These include: huge national debts, widespread availability of arms, the re-establishment of justice systems and land rights, economic diversification, environmental degradation and long-term climate change, the flight of Somali professionals, and the meeting of educational needs, particularly for those whose schooling has been interrupted by conflict.
Sustainable economic and social investment in Somalia requires application of the EC’s policy on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (European Commission, 1996b), where different types of aid are required simultaneously within the same country and even in the same district. The mid-term evaluation of the FRP highlighted the need for longer planning cycles, assured funding, and increased inter-sectoral planning.
With EC rehabilitation assistance provided to Somalia depending on the resolution and prevention of violent conflict at the local, national and regional levels, promotion and integration of peace-building and the need for a participatory community approach within all areas of engagement are clear priorities. The promotion of these objectives may well require increased involvement in less traditional sectors, including disarmament, demobilisation, and security sector reform, particularly in areas where there is sufficient security and failure to engage is likely to pose a threat to the recurrence of insecurity. While the EC has already undertaken a number of pilot peace-building projects and has commissioned assessments on potential areas for future assistance, it has yet to commit major support in these areas. Undertakings in this sphere will depend on the willingness of EU Member States to support Commission involvement in peace-building, as well as capacity to develop partnerships with UN agencies and other bodies engaged in support of complimentary initiatives.
Trade promotion will also need to be further developed within EC rehabilitation assistance. Given the lack of national institutions to ensure that international or regional trading requirements are met, mechanisms need to be established to enable the continuation and development of Somalia’s export potential. The recent ban on livestock export to Saudi Arabia, as well as the possibilities for developing the export of fish, clearly indicate that this is a high priority. Given the country’s reliance on two principal primary commodities - bananas and livestock - the EC should support economic diversification within its rehabilitation assistance for Somalia.
However, the EC must ensure that its promotion of economic development does not exacerbate existing tensions and is conducive to building sustainable peace and development. For example, while Somalia needs to continue its trade preferences within the banana protocol, due attention must be given to protecting the rights of the traditional owners of the banana plantations and ensuring that the proceeds of banana exports do not support continued war efforts.
While agreement on the fundamental principles on which the ACP-EU partnership is to be based will require negotiation among the entire ACP group, including with non-state partners, criteria for the allocation of resources and mechanisms for monitoring performance should involve a country-specific framework, and wider discussion with a full range of non-governmental actors.
Somalia provides an example where, in the absence of central government, donors have themselves drawn up country-specific criteria for the allocation of resources. For, at its establishment, a specific function of the SACB was to 'develop criteria for the allocation of resources to regions, with appropriate consistency between regions' (SACB, 1998b).
While the negotiating mandates of the European Commission and the ACP recognise the need for increased differentiation in allocating aid, based on the needs and particular vulnerabilities of ACP countries, the European Commission proposes to allocate resources according to each ACP country’s ‘merits based on performance and sound management’. In its recent Common Position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa, the European Council further stated its commitment to ‘consider increasing its support for African countries in which positive changes have taken place and where governments are engaged in promoting positive changes’ (European Union, 1998).
Application of the performance criteria proposed within the European Commission’s draft negotiating mandate to the current situation in Somalia makes clear the need to develop frameworks tailored to the specific circumstances within each ACP country (European Commission, 1998a). Under the 1993 Addis Ababa declaration, criteria for resource allocation in Somalia included the condition that peace and security as well as an adequate level of local participation should be in place before providing rehabilitation assistance. These have been further defined in response to the Somalia-specific situation where ‘a number of regions have been sliding back on the (relief, rehabilitation and development) continuum’. Recognition that Somali realities sometimes do not allow the declaration of a whole region as a rehabilitation area, but perhaps part of it, has led to the recent adoption of a comprehensive area-based approach 'which allows the EC to differentiate better' and enables the best use of limited developmental resources (Paffenholz, 1998). It is also recognised that assistance provided at the regional level, to strengthen local authorities or basic services through, for example, the development of school curriculum, is standardised and does not work against the potential re-emergence of national service provision.
While EC engagement in Somalia has increasingly sought to integrate peace-building as ‘a sector which cuts across the whole spectrum of problems to support the entire developmental programme’, considerable concerns have, been expressed with the effectiveness of the allocation of resources according to the ‘peace dividend approach’. While 'it is hoped that if some places get rehabilitation rewards for their peace and stability efforts that this will have a multiplying effect on other areas in the region' (Paffenholz, 1998), if such aid is to strengthen peace initiatives and avoid exacerbating existing tensions, it must be well-coordinated and provided within an approach that ensures the Commission’s full participation.
What does remain clear, however, is that actors to the partnership need to be afforded the means with which to meet the criteria established for resource allocation and by which performance is to be measured. If, for example, the international community demands that peace and security and the existence of responsible Somali authorities are prerequisites for investment in rehabilitation and development, the provision of assistance to those structures through which stability is to be maintained will need to be sustained. Efforts to improve stability are jeopardised where donors do not ensure continued support, as occurred when UNOSOM ceased its support to the police which it trained in north-east Somalia or UNDP/OPS withdrew its assistance to the National Demobilisation Commission in north-west Somalia/Somaliland.
While the European Commission’s draft mandate does not specify who will assess performance, it does propose increased non-state involvement in programming of development cooperation. As recommended within QUEST-Consult’s mid-term evaluation of the FRP, criteria for performance management could include 'monitoring certain aspects of actual use of the project by beneficiaries ... but also, for instance, the level of active community participation and ownership'.
Within discussion on criteria for the allocation of resources and measurement of performance, consideration should also be given to the creation of additional non-development incentives for good performers, including trade preferences and debt relief. This may ensure that dialogue is focused on the development of effective forms of engagement, rather than the threat of suspension in case of poor performance.
Finally, since international donors have already established a number of conditions and criteria for the allocation of aid, the efforts of the ACP-EU group to develop effective principles for partnership, and to translate these into country-specific criteria will need to be closely coordinated with other relevant international bodies.
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Annex 1: Addis Ababa Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, 1993
- Somalia is at a historic crossroads. The Somali people are exhausted, having suffered so much, for so long, from the continuing violence and turmoil. The Somali people are looking for urgent, sustainable solutions to their desperate situation. It is clear that time is running out.
- Participants at the meeting were fully aware that international reserves of patience and funds are running out. The overriding need to open a new chapter demanded that a map be drawn up for both the Somalis and the donor commodity in a productive relationship, in pursuit of a solution to the plight of the Somali people.
- Participants recognised that the leadership of Somalia has two choices; it can either move forward into rebuilding a civil society, or it can return to the quagmire of man-made strife and famine. Participants agreed that the way forward must be determined by the Somali people themselves.
- Participants concurred that at this critical stage, security, maintenance of law and order, and the creation of representative and accountable institutional structures are essential for rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Violence and threats of violence can no longer be tolerated. The participants, furthermore, agreed that rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance can and will be invested where the involvement of elders, local NGOs and representatives of the international community is allowed.
- The meeting welcomed and endorsed the declaration of the Somali participants that they stood ready to create peaceful conditions and a viable political atmosphere at district, regional and national levels for the smooth implementation of the humanitarian programmes. In this regard specific initiatives to be taken by the Somalis include disarming, with the assistance of the international community. There is also a need for support of local police forces as part of evolving judicial and penal systems, and where necessary, establishment of local security committees.
- The meeting focused on three main elements of the challenge facing the Somali people and their international partners viz.:
- the continuing emergency needs;
- the process towards reconstruction and rehabilitation; and
- economic management and governance.
- The representatives of the international community reaffirmed its commitment to provide unconditionally essential emergency assistance to vulnerable groups, especially children. They also recognised resource constraints faced by the implementing partners and agreed to address the needs of UN agencies and international NGOs.
- Further, the meeting underscored the importance of the Somali community being involved in identifying and assisting vulnerable groups and it stressed that emergency measures should be consistent with longer-term concerns of sustainable action.
- The meeting acknowledged that security and stability are prerequisites for investment in reconstruction and rehabilitation and that the involvement of the respective Somali institutions will render reconstruction and rehabilitation more effective. The meeting also acknowledged the complexity of reintegrating nearly one-seventh of the population who are presently away from their homes. However, Somali communities in all regions can promote reconstruction and rehabilitation by facilitating the voluntary return of displaced people and refugees who should contribute to the productive and economic life of those communities. Where appropriate, committees of elders and community leaders from camps for displaced persons and recipient communities should be established to facilitate the process of reintegration.
- The principal constraints identified in the rehabilitation of production, commerce and trade were inadequate marketing facilities, the collapse of economic infrastructure, the absence of a banking system, and the need for training and technical assistance. Somali participants emphasised, however, their readiness to do their utmost even under these difficult circumstances. Regarding marine resources, Somalia’s waters are being fished with impunity and the stock of fish is being depleted with debilitating long-term implications for the protection of the marine environment and the sustainability of marine resources. In this regard, assistance is being sought from Eritrea and Kenya to assist in instituting measures to prohibit illegal fishing in Somali waters. The key constraints identified in the social sectors were the lack of infrastructure, unsustainable financing mechanisms and absence, of public administration. Participants supported the full involvement of communities in designing sustainable systems for delivery of social services.
- It was agreed that all actions in the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation should contribute to enhancement of efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system. Further, these actions should be part of a coherent interim strategy as well as be consistent with a long-term framework for reconstruction and rehabilitation. In particular, every effort should be made to ensure that such actions, particularly where they have recurrent cost implications, should be sustainable in the longer run. The importance of the participation of women in the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation was stressed, particularly where those actions impact on areas where women have a primary role.
- The meeting agreed that systems of economic management and institution building, together with associated mechanisms for donor coordination, should be established to ensure that a number of current and potential problems be effectively tackled. The major problems raised included the lack of sustainability associated with existing investment projects, the lack of mechanisms for allocating resources and accountability, the lack of instruments to plan and prioritise expenditures, and the lack of absorptive capacity in the Somali economy.
- In order to move forward along the path of healing Somalia, the participants of the conference agreed to discharge their responsibilities as follows:
- Participants recognised that the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort in Somalia must be founded on the basic principle of Somali ownership of the process. They agreed that ownership means not only that the Somali people are fully involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, but that they must also bear responsibility for ensuring that the environment is conducive for reconstruction and development. In this connection, the participants welcomed the plan to launch immediately a Somali national UN Volunteers programme which will involve 500 Somali technicians and professionals as national UNV specialists and community development leaders.
- All participants called for Somali initiatives in establishing viable civil institutions and appropriate mechanisms to facilitate the reconstruction and recovery of Somalia, as well as to determine realistic goals and priorities. It is essential that through these mechanisms, Somalis agree on overall resource allocation by regions.
- The Somali representatives committed themselves:
- to establish the necessary preconditions to end the debilitating insecurity currently plaguing Somalia, including taking steps to disarm the militia as agreed in the Addis Ababa Accord of March 1993;
- to establish Regional Development Committees which would be responsible for prioritising regional development activities and for mobilising resources from communities in support of those activities;
- to establish a Development Council, composed of representatives of Regional Development Committees, to prioritise development activities among regions participating in the Development Council. The Development Council will develop a mechanism for mobilising resources and providing criteria for the allocation of those resources across regions and sectors;
- to accept the principle of the right of voluntary return of all displaced persons and refugees as part of the peace process and reconstruction;
- to establish, where appropriate, inter-party committees at various levels to solve issues relating to returning refugees and in particular the resolution of any outstanding issues relating to land ownership; and
- to establish mechanisms at the district level to ensure effective delivery of services.
- The donor community will be an effective supporter of the Somali people in the process of rehabilitation and recovery, once the necessary preconditions related to peace, security and reconciliation have been established.
- The donor community regrets the absence of important elements of Somalia political leadership from this meeting. Nevertheless, donors recognise the readiness of many regions to create the conditions necessary for rehabilitation and are prepared to assist these regions.
- Donors agreed to fully support the Development Council, as well as Regional Development Committee mechanisms to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation.
- Donors also agreed to collaborate and support the Development Office to ensure adequate communication, cooperation and coordination. Donors concurred that there should be common criteria for resource allocation to regions.
- Donors further agreed to develop a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources. In this regard, the Development Office would play the secretariat role, supporting an aid coordinating body composed of representatives of donors, UN agencies and programmes, NGOs, other multilateral and African institutions and organisations, and possibly countries in the region.
- Donors agreed to:
- identify common security and institutional criteria for providing assistance to the regions;
- provide assistance to prioritise development activities within the framework developed by the Development Council;
- establish mechanisms for channelling recurrent cost funding in a sustainable manner, and in developing common accounting criteria;
- coordinate donor strategies for supporting Somali institutions of management and economic governance;
- provide development assistance in a manner consistent with the World Bank -led Planning Framework; and
- work with the Development Committee and the Development Office in establishing sustainable salary levels for local employees.
The meeting also recognised the contributions of the OAU, LAS and OIC.
UNOSOM
- UNOSOM committed itself to work with all concerned agencies and organisations to strengthen coordination of all aspects of the United nations efforts throughout Somalia - humanitarian, political, and peacekeeping. To facilitate this UNOSOM will intensify efforts to strengthen its operations in the field.
- The Division of Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation will be reorganised and strengthened to effectively respond to the transition from relief through rehabilitation and reconstruction to development with a coherent strategy, especially during the critical period immediately ahead. It should also strengthen its field presence.
- The Development Office would embrace the skills and experience of the Somali professionals, UN agencies and NGOs. It should be staffed at the proper senior levels so as to support Somali efforts in the establishment of functioning public institutions and economic instruments to manage the process of rehabilitation and development. Its functions will include:
- serving as a Secretariat for the Development Council, and of the aid coordinating body; and
- provide analysis of policy and operational issues relevant to effectiveness of development activities in Somalia.
- Agencies and programmes of the United Nations system and International NonGovernmental Organisations must function as creative facilitators in the process of implementing donor assistance.
- The UN system is fully committed to support the Somali people in their rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The UN system stands ready to work within the agreed institutional framework and mechanisms to ensure close collaboration and coordination, including coordinating their own activities on a sectoral basis. In this context, organisations of the UN system pledged their full support to UNOSOM and expressed their readiness to strengthen their presence and actions in Somalia. The UN system is prepared, by experience and commitment, to provide and participate in the coordination of the necessary inputs for transferring to the Somali people the ownership of the process for reconstruction and development of their country. The UN agencies and programmes expect to continue providing assistance and support as long as required, recognising the needs to move beyond emergency and dependency to more normal modes of cooperation and coordination directed at sustained governance and growth.
- International NGOs reaffirmed their commitment to the Somali people and to continue to work with them towards the rebuilding of their nation and civil society. International NGOs are already engaged in participatory processes with communities and emerging local structures in Somalia and they will continue to maximize their efforts in these directions.
- International NGOs are already engaged in participatory processes with communities and emerging local structures in Somalia and they will continue to maximize their efforts in these directions.
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- All participants agreed to cooperate fully in the establishment of sectoral working groups under the guidance of the Development Council, comprising Somali professionals, appropriate UN agencies and programmes, UNOSOM, donors, local and international NGOs in developing sectoral strategies consistent with long-term sustainable development withing the Planning Framework.
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- In the final analysis, all our efforts aim at restoring the belief in the future of Somalia. It is the fate of the children and future generations of the Somalia people which is at stake. History will judge how divisions were set aside in order to achieve a better future for them. The humanitarian nightmare must not be allowed to return to haunt Somalia and the world.
- Therefore, this Addis Ababa Declaration of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia should be translated into a six-month Plan of Action before the end of the year.
Adopted 1 December 1993
Addis Ababa
Annex 2: Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia, 8 February 1995
One year after the adoption of the Addis Ababa Declaration which defined the conditions for aid activities in Somalia, donors and other international partners have reviewed the criteria for continuing their rehabilitation and development assistance to that country. The collective membership of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), comprising donors, UN Agencies, and international NGOs, believes that there must be movement towards the establishment of a more stable environment which will permit Somali and international organisations to operate in safety and security, and at a lower operational cost than prevailing at present. Such an environment will ensure that resources can be used to maximum effect to promote the welfare of the Somali people, especially the most vulnerable groups.
International assistance to Somalia is founded on the basic principle that responsibility for its effective execution shall remain with the Somali people. It is expected, therefore, that responsible Somali authorities will assume their proper role to ensure that conditions exist for the effective implementation of aid activities.
Donors and other international partners are prepared to consider rehabilitation and development assistance in areas where a number of conditions are fulfilled. The following principles, drawn up by the SACB, define the circumstances required for the successful and sustainable implementation of rehabilitation and development assistance. The same principles are also applicable for humanitarian assistance with due regard to its particular nature.
1.Agencies working with the Somali people will:
1.1 Pay due regard to local social customs, cultural and religious values;
1.2 Maintain impartiality in the conduct of their activities; and
1.3 Develop a coordinated approach to programme implementation.
2.For their part, the responsible Somali authorities must guarantee:
2.1 That secure conditions prevail for aid agencies and their staff (as evidenced by the absence of acts such as banditry, kidnapping, extortion and other forms of violence); and
2.2 That they pursue and bring to justice the perpetrators of criminal acts.
3.The responsible Somali authorities must also provide the necessary conditions for the implementation of rehabilitation and development activities by:
3.1 Providing office and residential premises to agencies (where available);
3.2 Allowing agencies to decide how to meet their own transport needs;
3.3 Allowing agencies to decide their local staffing needs, and to employ staff on technical merits in accordance with project requirements;
3.4 Exempting all aid personnel and aid-related cargo (including fuel) from duties, taxes and any other form of levy; and
3.5 Publishing a scale of reasonable tariffs for the payment of services rendered at the demand of an agency for the clearance of aid cargo at ports and airports.
4 The SACB will monitor closely the implementation of this Code and advise the donors and other international partners to take appropriate action whenever deemed necessary, including suspension of activities.
Somalia Aid Coordination Body - 8 February 1995
Annex 3: Final Document, FOURTH SACB MEETING, Rome, 29-30 May 1997
At the invitation of the Government of Italy, the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) comprising Donors, United Nations Agencies, International Non-governmental Organisations and other International and Inter-Governmental Organisations, in particular, IGAD, its member states as weIl as Egypt and Yemen, organised in Rome, Italy, on 29 and 30 May 1997, the Fourth SACB Meeting. This meeting was held to review the situation of international aid involvement to support social, economic and political reconstruction in Somalia in accordance with the December 1993 Addis Ababa Declaration which was re-affirmed as the basis of the SACB and continued international community assistance to Somalia.
The meeting took place at a moment when positive momentum towards regional and national reconciliation in Somalia inspires cautious optimism. The participants noted and applauded the recent efforts of Sub-regional, Regional and International Organisations and Governments to assist the political process in Somalia with the aim of national reconciliation which will enable Somalia to regain its position in the International Community. The meeting was encouraged by the positive impact on the peace process of the continuing relative stability and the considerable socio-economic recovery in certain parts of the country particularly the Northwest and Northeast, and by the current spirit of dialogue and compromise in Mogadishu.
The international community called upon the Somali people, in particular, the Somali leadership, the civil society and the private sector, to build upon these positive developments and produce concrete results which will give additional impetus to national reconciliation. This would, inter-alia, promote the return and reintegration of the large number of Somalis currently outside the country. The meeting re-confirmed that re-building the political, social and economic structures of Somalia remains the responsibility of the Somali people. The meeting further affirmed the crucial role of women for the promotion of peace and development in Somalia.
At this important cross-roads in the history of Somalia, the international community affirmed its readiness to provide adequate and co-ordinated assistance in support of such positive momentum. The international aid community would welcome the upgrading of dialogue with the Somali side, reflecting the current political progress towards national reconciliation, in order to contribute to increased efficiency in the utilisation of humanitarian and rehabilitation resources.
The participants recognised the importance of the attached document5 containing the guidelines for a strategy for the international aid community on humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance to Somalia that identifies three main objectives.
- help prevent the re-occurrence of a massive humanitarian disaster;
- assist Somali-led initiatives for good governance and socio-economic recovery at local level; and
- contribute to peace and political stability at both local and national levels.
In particular the participants agreed that the strategic framework should be based on the following points: - Peace, security and the existence of Somali authorities at local and regional level are prerequisites for the provision of rehabilitation and development assistance. This "peace dividend approach" aims to ensure that international assistance is not only relevant to local efforts for reconstruction but also to peace building. The sustainability of the peace process will be enhanced by the promotion of a culture of peace.
- Enhanced international aid co-ordination should be built on greater decentralisation of operational co-ordination to the field inside Somalia while maintaining the essential and indispensable linkages with the strategic framework and sectoral policy approach of the
- SACB.
- Adequate funding and long-term financial commitment by the donor community are necessary to ensure effective international aid involvement and allow the implementation of the strategy of the international community in Somalia. To this end, the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia should receive renewed urgent consideration.
- The SACB should promote regular dialogue and consultations with regional and subregional organisations, in particular IGAD, and development banks, and, if so requested, provide advice on aid issues concerning Somalia. In particular, the SACB should offer its expertise to IGAD, its Secretariat and the IGAD Partners Forum regarding the elaboration of sectoral policies of regional interest that include Somalia.
Finally, the participants affirmed that the commitment of the Somali people to peace and stability remains the most important factor in the process of recovery, and requested the Chairperson of the Fourth SACB meeting, Senator Rino Serri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy, to communicate and to discuss the outcome of the Rome meeting with the Somali people and their leaders in order to enhance a constructive partnership towards peace building, reconstruction and development.
Acronyms
| Box 1: Acronyms
|
ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| EC | European Community |
| ECHO | European Community Humanitarian Office |
| EDF | European Development Fund |
| EU | European Union |
| FRP | First Rehabilitation Programme |
| IGAD | Inter-Governmental Authority on Development |
| IPFIGAD | Partners Forum |
| NGOs | Non-governmental organisations |
| NIP | National Indicative Programme |
| PPEWU | Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit |
| RIP | Regional Indicative Programme |
| SACB | Somalia Aid Coordination Body |
| SRP | Second Rehabilitation Programme |
| Stabex | The Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
Updated: 8 February 1999