The Political Dimensions of the Future ACP-EU Partnership:
How to Promote Human Rights, Democracy and Governance Dimensions

André Monkam

(Full Text of ECDPM Working Paper Number 41, December 1997)

For related ECDPM publications
To order a paper copy

This paper should be cited as:

Monkam, A. 1997.
The Political Dimensions of the Future ACP-EU Partnership: How to Promote Human Rights, Democracy and Governance Dimensions (ECDPM Working Paper No. 41).
Maastricht: ECDPM.

Contents

• A Retrospective on Democratic Processes in Africa
• Future Scenarios
• ACP Proposals

A Retrospective on Democratic Processes in Africa

The true process of democratisation (multi-party system, pluralist elections, etc.), or, as J. F. Bayart puts it, the "process of authoritarian decompression" began at the end of the 1980s, following a combination of internal and external factors. Internally, we observe democratic calls from the African elite’s and the powers in place facing up to a crisis of legitimacy deriving from economic failure and authoritarianism. All this translates, on the ground, into demonstrations and strikes.

External factors included the end of the Cold War; the speech by President François Mitterrand at the Franco-African summit at La Baule, where he made the moralisation of political life a condition for development aid; and finally massive pressure from donors and international opinion.

The democratic transition, more lengthy in some countries than in others, has occurred in four different ways:

• through national conferences
• without a national conference
• without a multi-party system but with political debate
• by "force of arms"

Benin was the first impact point of the democratic revolution wrought through national conferences. In the mid-1980s, the financial crisis had rendered the treasuries in almost all African countries unable to support certain burdens: civil servants' salaries, student grants, etc. The unrest that followed reached its climax in Benin in December 1989, with a national general strike. The various donors approached to help the country out of this impasse imposed as a condition the holding of a sort of forum, later dubbed a national conference: a major national political gathering intended to establish a report on past socio-political life and to renew its institutions.

After this forum in February 1990, significant political decisions (notably, a new constitution) giving fresh confidence to the people were taken.

The invitation to imitate the Benin pattern of transition seems to have given shape to the field of democratisation in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. Under pressure from the donors, other countries decided, as from 1990, to organise conferences. Compared to Benin's, they had two characteristics:

• they showed significant variations;
• as the countries progressed in the organisation of national conferences, there were cases where the old repudiated political leaders tried, more or less successfully, to control the transition movement so as to restore their crisis-rocked power.

Ritually speaking, Nigeria and the Congo remained quite close to the Benin pattern. However, they deepened its popular expression: with confessions and settling of scores. Unlike Benin's national conference, Gabon's was not sovereign. This allowed Omar Bongo substantial room for manoeuvre and meant that he was always master of the situation. Despite the channelling of the political forces, the national conference nevertheless succeeded in gaining recognition for a "new era of pluralist democracy" (integral multi-party system, formation of a transitional government, election, etc.).

On taking power in Chad on 1 December 1990, Idriss Deby promised to organise a national conference. This was held 3 years later, in January 1993. Overall, Chad awarded itself institutions with some legitimacy (which fairly well reflected different political sensitivities), adoption of an electoral code and a draft constitution, installation of the high council for communications and an independent national electoral commission.

The national conference in Togo has had a violent history, but has nevertheless succeeded in leading to pluralist elections. Burundi's has been replaced by a tribal war, and in Zaire the transition has recently recommenced.

In order to side-step popular demands, to get round the national conferences and to introduce democracy by "fits and starts", certain regimes discovered direct pluralist elections to be both a strategy to catch their opposition off-guard and to dislocate them, as well as a "legal" way to control the democratic process (Ivory Coast). Others, like Cameroon or Burkina Faso, organised sorts of national conferences (a national reconciliation forum in Burkina Faso, a tripartite forum in Cameroon). In both cases, decisions reached during the sessions could not be contrary to the constitution, and participants could only address subjects appearing on an agenda that was controlled by the existing powers.

Accordingly, this group of countries run by political "friends" of the West is currently in an endless state of transition, each able to proceed in its own way and at its own speed, decorating the institutional framework with all manner of democratic varnishes, giving back some space for freedom to the populations, but retaining the status quo for the sake of certain interests.

Certain East African countries, like Kenya, decided to expand the debate within the single party, just like those, like Uganda, which were emerging from civil wars. In contexts like this, the highest value is civil peace, and democracy is meaningful only if it has the shape of this. In others, the political transition has been facilitated by a military coup.

The most prominent example is Mali, where General Toumani Touré overthrew the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré and installed democracy.

Whether it be a "success" (Benin, Madagascar), or a "failure" (Zaire), the democratisation process has started in many places. Everywhere, we have witnessed authoritarianism in crisis, States in crisis, development in crisis. Those in Africa and elsewhere who considered democracy as a "luxury" for Africa have changed their minds. However, the path of pluralist democracy is delicate, tortuous, long and fraught with pitfalls, and those countries which have rapidly and successfully made the political transition will more easily manage the difficulties and develop faster than the others.

Success is due to the "catharsis effect" produced by the national conferences. In Benin, all the 524 delegates from 14 organisations, gatherings and others met together to draw up a no-holds-barred report. The former leaders acknowledged their wrongdoing and asked for public forgiveness. The country picked up again on a new basis. Nowadays, the changeover of political power is real. In those countries that have failed in the transition, or are progressing very slowly, responsibility rests with the leaders of the former single parties. After dragging their feet from the beginning, they are now still clinging to power, against the wishes of their fellow-citizens. They are using all the tricks in the book: Bringing forward elections to beat a poorly-prepared opposition, all manner of electoral frauds (manipulation of electoral rolls, falsification of results, electoral trickery), militarisation and tribalisation of the transition, the politics of the stomach. All these countries still have far to go.

Generally speaking, what emerges right now is that there is no alternative being proposed to achieve the transformation of the societies and productive structures, because the two crises that the African countries ought to have resolved by the end of this transitional period are the crisis affecting the political system and the unproductiveness of the economic system.

The constitutions coming out of the national conferences and other methods of transition have successfully controlled the method of accession to power in the successful cases of transition. For example, in Benin, the driving forces have demonstrated the ability to map out original approaches to maximise Benin's own assets.

Thanks to the multi-party system, we are faced on the one hand by the former single party offering a programme for government with such general objectives that it is simply organising the "sharing of the cake". On the other hand we see opposition parties, generally created and directed by the "starving" or those excluded from the former single party, and lacking any credible programme to stimulate the emerging social groups. Mediocre opposition parties in most cases are divided, powerless and infiltrated by the party in power. Informed poorly, if at all, about the economic, social, political and cultural situation in the country, they generally satisfy themselves with perfecting demagogic utterances and slogans for greater liberty, or slogans calling for the ousting of the ruling juntas. There are no movements like Solidarity in Poland, no thinkers like Havel (the former opposition politician and current President of the Czech Republic). Finally, we now find ourselves faced with a multi-party system with no real party. Virtually everywhere where opposition parties have reached power after multi-party systems, they have lost it subsequently. This gives the impression of a simple change in administrative elite to benefit from the advantages of power.

The main internal obstacles to political reforms are undoubtedly socio-cultural in nature:

The absence of a democratic culture; this slippage between the still-dominant African community spirit and the mental and behavioural dispositions demanded by the practice of liberal democracy - respect for difference - which blend into individualism.

• The very conception of power in black Africa: In the current situation regarding political sociology in Africa, two elements characterise the exercise of power - the dense concentration of power in one person’s hands, and the "property administration" situation conferred by the conquest of a political area.

• The tradition of enrichment through political power: hose who hold it normally want to keep it.

• The education of the citizens: Mrs. Sandra Day O'Connor, a US judge, was quite right when she said that "one of the most solid pillars of democracy is the education of the citizens, whether instruction or raising of consciousness of civic duties. Whatever the cost, efforts must be channelled into education, because the issue is the future of democracy and the economic and social well-being of the population.". With mostly uneducated populations, reforms move slowly.

Socio-economic: the economic crisis has brought about structural adjustment programmes. The democratic movements unleashed in this context raise the problem of compatibility between the two objectives of democracy and structural adjustment.

Socio-political:

• Supporters of the old order find it difficult to distinguish between the party in power and the opposition parties. These are well-skilled in the politics of the stomach, and generally guarantee hidden internal and external interests which cannot be safeguarded without compromising democratic transparency.


• The atomisation of the opposition forces.

• recognition and application of democratic principles;
• consolidation of the State of law;
• sound management of public affairs;
• respect for human rights.

One might summarise these conditions as progress on political reforms. Yet some questions nonetheless occur to us:

• who will measure this progress?
• how will it be measured?
• using what measuring instruments?
• what speed is desired?

The interests involved are so numerous, divergent and important that it is difficult to talk about the degree of realism in what has been done to date in connection with political reforms concerning both the content and the speed of the process. In certain cases, the very future of the transition is uncertain (resurgence of military coups and other rebellions: Zaire, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, etc.).

Already somewhat condemned by the economic policies accompanying it, this political adventure runs still greater risks of foundering by having no target and no philosophical guarantee. The absence of any intellectual safeguards on political actions is the more serious as the disorder generated by the struggle for the "new distribution" of Africa grows more pronounced. Yet, more than ever, thinking patterns must be reworked, at the very least in redefining the role of the State and in-depth reflection on the margins of democratic liberty to defend. Like yesterday, with the emergence of independence, today’s political reforms have been preceded by no preparations by the elite’s; accordingly their content and speed are decided by reference to covert interests. More than ever, partners like the EU should encourage the organisation of civil society, of all the social groups supporting the democratisation process, viz: the urban middle classes, the unions, the universal churches, women, farmers. Because, despite current setbacks, there is every reason to believe that over the long term, reforms will be imposed in the meaning and direction of history.

Future Scenarios

• positive in those countries where transition has been accepted, engaged or successfully handled, or is succeeding;

• negative in those cases where these reforms have either failed, or are blocked, delayed by the supporters of the old order.

Regarding the first, any future political partnership should - now that the method of accession to power is settled in those countries - enable them not only to improve the institutional framework, but to re-shape the structures of society and even to lay the foundations for a typically African-style democratic model that takes account of local realities.

Regarding the second, it is clear that governments will be reluctant to accept the integration of the political element into the partnership - they will invoke all manner of reasons: Interference, respect for sovereignty, etc., all with the aim to hang on to power and maintain intact our States’ predatory systems.

Civil society, at any event, favours the integration of the political dimension. It is conscious of the role that the external partners might play in the political reform process. It understands that dictatorships have trouble sustaining themselves without the backing of the colonising powers. Relations between the countries and these powers are not transparent, and their vectors and articulations are not widely known among the general public. Therefore, civil society and the leaders of the forces of progress attach substantial weight to the political element in relations with the EU, because this could liberate them from the perversions witnessed in relations with the old metropolitan countries dominated by colonial behaviour patterns.

Nowadays, all countries, even those not really wishing to, declare themselves committed to a process of democratisation. And, given the influence of the political dimension on socio-economic development, it is necessary to integrate this political dimension into a partnership that aims precisely to combat poverty.

To get back definitively onto the path of development, we need a minimum of political consensus, which has been broadly achieved in the case of the successful national conferences. In the others, we need to define the institutions appropriate for an irreversible advance of democracy and progress.

The success of development cooperation depends heavily on the degree of involvement (participation and control) of populations and the civil society. The organisation and accountability of civil society need to be sought after as a priority in the political dimension of partnership. In this way, outside the traditional domains contained in Article 5 of Lomé IV, other components ought to be taken into account in the new political dimension. The most relevant seem to be:

• decentralisation;
• the enlargement of the players in cooperation;
• the institutions for control and justice;
• the process of popular consultations.

This decentralisation is political and financial. In no way is it an administrative decentralisation, which, generally, is an instrument of domination of the ruling party. It is a decentralisation of the political institutions such as the municipalities which need financial autonomy. They require to be set up according to a democratic process and to participate actively in the development process (definition and planning of projects, implementation and control of programmes).

Enlarging the players in cooperation will mean that objective criteria can be devised to "measure" political reforms. This enlargement needs to reach the parliamentarians and the locally-elected representatives of representative political formations, the unions and professional bodies.

In this respect, it would be interesting to set up a four-part guidance committee for the ACP-EU partnership, involving each ACP country’s government, its opposition, its civil society and the EU.

The institutions of control and justice represent the cornerstone of democratisation and sound governance. They must be independent of government, otherwise decisions will be influenced by the latter and it will appoint its leaders by reference to their political allegiance.

Generally speaking, this component of the partnership might involve aiding the ACP countries in sub-Saharan Africa to draft fundamental texts which would prevent positions of power from being perpetuated, a corollary of the concentration of all powers in one individual’s hands, even if he is the President of the Republic. The fundamental text that forms the constitution must guarantee:

• limitation to the presidential term of office;
• effective separation between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary;
• the guarantee of individual and collective liberties, etc.

Supervision of the democratic process must be reinforced by improved control of the preparation and implementation of elections, notably through the generalisation of the setting-up of autonomous national electoral commissions (called CENA in French), whose responsibilities include re-drafting the electoral rolls, issuing voting cards, establishing the number and location of polling stations, training the scrutineers, the participation of international observers with differing backgrounds (not simply those in power), the displaying of lists of voters and polling stations, the supervision of operations on the ground, participating in the vote-counting, respect for complaint procedures, announcing the results, etc. In most of our countries, the electoral process is entirely controlled by the administration. Against this background, can we talk about democratic processes when we think that in 20 or 30 years, the EU will continue to participate in this masquerade without anything fundamentally changing.

The prime condition for the success of the partnership would be the harmonisation of the viewpoints and sanctions by the EU countries. Insofar as the interests are divergent, the viewpoints likewise diverge between partners in the Union. African leaders understand this weakness, which encourages them to persist on the wrong track. In most sub-Saharan African countries, there are sham democracies, and nothing whatsoever is done to get genuine democracies installed. The EU countries are conscious of this state of affairs. Under cover of democracy, there is the rule of the single party, the State party, the regrettable difference being that this costs the national community more (hostile regions abandoned, underground expenditure to support covert "mole" parties, corruption of all kinds to manufacture oneself a majority in Parliament).

Until EU countries agree on the sanctions to apply, and on the scrupulous respect for those sanctions, Africa’s leaders will continue to operate sham democracies, leading to conflict and coups. Under such circumstances, the EU should not be particular about the aid it grants.

Under the logic of partnership as currently recommended, the conditions defined by current practice no longer seem appropriate. Under the new partnership, the role of internal institutions is very important. The objectives, the results to be achieved and the time-scales are defined jointly between the parties, with the participation of the driving forces of the nation. The obligations of both sides are agreed jointly. This way, the conditions are defined endogenously, not imposed from outside.

The enlargement of the players in cooperation to embrace all the driving forces of the nation is a necessary condition for the partnership to effectively mobilise resources for economic development and the sustainable struggle against poverty.

Regarding human rights, the national and international organisations for the defence of these rights should be involved in the negotiations ahead of the monitoring and evaluation of performances.

The implementation of cooperation programmes will depend endogenously upon overall performances. Countries which have successfully achieved the democratic transition already have control institutions: The partnership will develop at most to reinforce them. Negotiations will advance faster, and given the reality of the changeover of power, there must be more stable bodies designed for development. Mobilisation of cooperation resources will depend upon performances, which are the intermediate results admitted and sought-after by all parties. This arrangement is similar to that for cooperation with the ILO, which integrates the unions.

Progress on political reforms can be measured by reference to certain "outputs", which include the fundamental texts guaranteeing changeovers of power, the separation of powers, an improvement in the conditions for the enjoyment of human rights (significant reduction in the number of persons detained for their opinions, political refugees, opponents), greater involvement of major opposition parties in the management of the city (number of summit-level meetings between principal protagonists, account taken of opposition opinions in the fundamental acts of the Republic), maximum duration of an individual’s term as Head of State, frequency of changeover, autonomy of local political institutions.

The players who might take a decisive part in measuring the progress of political reforms are international observers, civil society, the most representative political parties and NGOs, the churches. There must be a good mix of these components to ensure genuine representation.

Regarding the objective of democratisation, the civil society to be taken into account is that involved in the civic training of the population, consciousness-raising and directing mass attitudes. This might include opinion leaders such as journalists, churches, unions, professional associations (doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.) and certain NGO’s.

Following the introduction of multi-party arrangements, the advance of democratisation appears to be linked to the civic training of citizens and their skills in discerning and expressing their wishes. In many African countries, the former single party which has remained in power controls the administration and many of the country’s cadres. It becomes very difficult to mobilise human resources for other political formations. Sometimes, traditional chiefs are integrated by the ruling party as administrative auxiliaries and are therefore mobilised directly or indirectly for the latter.

Only civil society offers opportunities for independent reflection aimed at promoting a freer, fairer society. Political parties are too frequently engaged in gaining power, so the role of consciousness-raising and accountability for the populations, with regard to important problems facing society, which should be handled by the leadership, falls to civil society.

Beyond action at grass-roots level, civil society should participate in the definition of the rules of the democratic game and the control of political players. However, the role of civil society cannot be decisive without the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary, for it needs access to an independent legal system in order to rule on cases involving serious violations of the rules of the democratic game.

African countries are generally juxtapositions of socio-linguistic entities differing significantly with regard to traditions and management of the public good. The state institutions have managed to ensure a certain level of integration and unity. However, the feeling of accountability among the populations at the bottom is largely achieved through their involvement in the management of the public good. As things stand, it is not easy to involve them actively at the national level, with certain national directions being adopted beyond the very understanding of the masses. Involvement at the bottom means the specific features of each community can be taken and liberated.

Decentralisation very usefully accompanies democratisation by promoting more responsibility and involvement of the populations. For example, if the management of the municipalities is entirely autonomous, the populations of each town gain a concrete understanding of the scope of the political debate. Decentralised partnership in this framework means that development at the grass roots can be improved and promoted. Socio-economic development (better trained population, with income-generating activities) is essential to realise democratisation. How are we to imagine democratisation for an isolated community simply producing subsistence goods, illiterate and slavishly obeying a traditional chief? Because central power through the enfeoffed chief can readily manipulate the population. Local institutions and NGO’s working at the grass roots have a pivotal role here. They need to work gradually to inculcate in these populations a fresh world view, to demonstrate to them that they can and should aspire to a better life, by engaging in more remunerative activities offering them access to basic social services.

The EU should support political reforms technically and financially in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Technically, it should press for participation in the supervision of the electoral process. Similarly, it should assist in the framing of laws and regulations. Financially, it should support the material organisation of elections (financing seminars, conferences, voting material, etc.).

These various types of support can be given concrete shape in the setting-up of a project for support to the democratisation process. This would actually amount to medium- or long-term assistance (minimum 10 years). The priority field of action relates to the drafting of laws and regulations to guarantee institutional stability and the smooth changeover of power. The second area concerns effective participation in the electoral process.

The EU enjoys the advantage of being a grouping of countries with democratic experiences that vary but are, overall, similar. So every sub-Saharan African ACP country can find a model of a democratic process it can adapt to. The multilateral aid agencies lack the experience of managing democratic processes. The bilateral ones have their models which are well known. The variety of experiences of democratic processes within the EU constitutes the latter’s principal added value over other aid agencies.

Support for non-state players raises problems regarding identifying the beneficiaries, and understanding their exact priority needs. The principal needs of these players would revolve around improved organisation of structures, technical and financial support. NGO’s, human-rights organisations and non-state press suffer very widely from organisational problems. The roles and responsibilities within these structures are generally poorly defined and generate leadership problems. Technically, training is non-existent. There is a shortage of exchanges of experiences between non-state players. The actions cannot all be given concrete shape unless these players have a minimum of financial resources.

EU support for non-state players might therefore be imagined as a threefold matter, as indicated above: Support for the organisation of the groups, technical support through training sessions, retraining or courses, and finally, financial support for the most representative groups.

Any independent spirit considers that the European democratic models are the least bad, and this opinion is widely shared by the non-governing African elite’s. These are models which may offer equality of opportunities for all. The African models of democracy perpetuate the influence of a small governing class to the detriment of the majority. This small class generally consists of elite’s originating from the same tribe as the Head of State. The power stakes can be summed up as a permanent search to conserve the national cake. Congo is an example of this.

Everyone wants his share, and for as long as possible. Any European pattern likely to disturb the established order meets vigorous opposition. These elite’s therefore refer to the imposition of European democratic models.

How can they be persuaded to admit that the issue lies elsewhere, that individuals come and go, but the nation must remain?

Any effort along these lines by the donors is interpreted as interference in the State’s internal affairs. We consider that the EU should not shy away from such arguments. Democracy leads to good governance, and the opposite is not necessarily true. Should we encourage good governance which flouts fundamental human rights, the absence of individual and collective freedoms, all things which democracy guarantees? In our opinion, in reality, there is not one European model of democracy. Democracy, when properly exercised, is the best system of management for the individual and the group. Exceptions tend to be taken as the rule concerning good governance. Those countries with good governance but without democracy are generally those with a long-established tradition of management of the city (South Korea, for example). Africa’s leaders reject what they call the European model of democracy, that very thing which guarantees changeovers of power. If, unfortunately, events drove them one day into opposition, they would be the first to demand democracy, whether European-style or otherwise. For us, democracy should be practised in sub-Saharan Africa as it is elsewhere. It is because of the refusal among the governing class to exercise it within the required standards, encouraged by the former colonial powers, that there are doubts surrounding the wisdom of democracy. At any event, democracy should take precedence over good governance, not the reverse.

ACP Proposals

First, all the ACP States have signed the revised Lomé IV Convention. Article 5 stipulates that cooperation first targets human development, which supposes "respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of the law, and sound management of public affairs". Pending the ratification of the Convention by all the signatory countries, the green paper concentrated on the political dimension of the future partnership, stating that aid-related expenditure would be accompanied by conditions regarding respect for the provisions of Article 5 of the Convention, and economic performance.

It is therefore worth focusing on the correlation between economic performance, democracy, respect for human rights, and the sound management of public affairs. Emphasising the importance and the sign of this correlation is critical in the attitude of the ACP countries, and will stand at the centre of the dialogue between the EU and the ACP on this question. The clarification of the linkage between (human) development, democracy and good governance is essential, because for many African leaders, democracy does not necessarily equate to development. Likewise, the absence of democracy does not imply poor governance. The experience of certain countries, such as China or Korea, illustrates that good governance has provided an impetus for development which has enabled democracy to become established. Democracy may even hamper reforms, particularly when these require immediate sacrifices and can deliver results only in the long term. The case of certain French-speaking African countries confirms the accuracy of these statements. In short, one of the objectives of young ACP States entails consolidating their identity as sovereign nations. In that case, national cohesion requires to be preserved, because the risks of division, regionalism and even secession (as with the English-speaking part of Cameroon) are very real. Yet, human rights and fundamental freedoms do not dominate over the objectives of national cohesion, civil peace, or even development. The dialogue between the ACP and the EU might also address this issue.

Faced with the EU’s interventionism and paternalism, the ACP countries have an interest in expanding internal reforms towards a more democratic society, consolidating national and regional integration, and avoiding their marginalisation. The political dialogue between them and the EU might concentrate on joint foreign policy, the fate of Africans in Europe, the struggle against poverty and the problems of indebtedness. Likewise, the notion of good governance must be properly defined to avoid case-by-case interpretations. The same applies to the criteria for assessing the objectives of the democratic process. Perhaps voting rights for all may need to be ensured, and political changeovers guaranteed at the various power levels. Likewise, the political dialogue between the ACP and the EU might favour the setting-up of such legal provisions. However, given the absence of a consensus among European countries regarding the assessment of these provisions, the option of a shared European strategy on political dialogue can only be well perceived.

Preserving the role of the State is an important element in that dialogue, together with the integration of emerging players from the private sector, civil society and the NGO’s, which must likewise be required to operate sound management. The ACP countries might also emphasise the greater role played by transnational companies in favour of internationalisation.

One of the objectives of the new EU-ACP partnership entails addressing the particular situations of every regional or sub-regional group, or the States individually, in order to deliver appropriate, relevant solutions to them in the framework of the Convention, drawing upon local realities.

To this end, global or regional approaches do not preclude some differentiation of treatment in certain domains to take account of the specific features belonging to each region or State. For instance, the criteria of the heavily-indebted countries might well constitute an appropriate differentiation factor.

This differentiation might draw upon the following criteria: a) the "multi-polarity" of the world economy, which operates following a pattern of poles and sub-poles; b) the possibility for certain ACP countries to benefit from attractive poles other than Europe.

The point is that for the Caribbean and Pacific countries, Europe represents just one more opportunity. The Caribbean is now firmly ensconced within the massive arena of inter-American free trade. The Pacific countries border an economic and commercial area containing Japan, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, offering them markets and capital.

That leaves the sub-Saharan African region, and within that, sub-regions lacking homogeneity among themselves regarding their degree of economic integration and development in general. Therefore the regionalisation of European aid is liable to reinforce and accelerate sub-regional integration and guarantee improved account being taken of the problems specific to the African region by their European partners. From this angle, the introduction of differentiation into future EU-ACP cooperation is necessary. But this is not a compartmentalisation of the ACP countries aimed at reducing their negotiating strength vis-à-vis more powerful partners. The ACP group must remain as it is and continue to show solidarity when embarking on political negotiations with the EU.

While it appears necessary to take account of the different situations experienced by different regions, it likewise appears inappropriate, despite the disparities observed between the countries in one sub-region, to exacerbate these through differentiation. Regional integration already delivers a solution to the most disadvantaged countries, while the national indicative programmes emerge definitively as a sound application of differentiation.

Interestingly, the accession of South Africa to the Lomé Convention last April was "differentiated". It will become a member of all the Convention’s institutions, but because of its level of economic development, will not benefit from the European Development Fund or commercial preferences.

Differentiated accession enables South Africa to develop its cooperation with the remaining ACP countries, but also enables its businesses to take up calls for tenders for development projects in countries financed by the 8th EDF. South Africa’s participation in the revised Lomé IV Convention will furthermore be accompanied by a bilateral aspect which should result in a cooperation and commerce agreement between it and the EU. This agreement should open a free-trade area between South Africa and the EU.

This represents a new deal which the remaining African ACP countries will need to take into account in the framework of differentiation. The hypothesis of a global agreement for the sub-Saharan African region, including South Africa, designed to reinforce that region’s negotiating power, is no longer tenable. Therefore the agreement should proceed without South Africa, and with several supplementary sub-regional agreements. Within the sub-regional agreements, particular attention could be paid to countries burdened with debt.

As was pointed out recently in Amsterdam during the workshop on "Lomé passée" organised by INZET, the term conditionality is not compatible with partnership. This is because, between partners, there can be no question of one-way conditions, but rather, inter-linked conditions. The expression "mutually agreed obligations" would be more appropriate to a genuine partnership, characterised by concepts of equality, respect for sovereignty and mutual interest.

That being so, what shape might these mutual obligations take? For ACP countries, the political setting of the new partnership needs to be reinforced in its applicability. The political "obligation" regarding human rights, respect for fundamental freedoms and individual values, and sound management of the nation, must condition the unblocking of that portion of the aid envelope intended for supporting long-term institutional reforms and operations for public-sector support. What objective assessment criteria might be applied?

Regarding the democratic process, there might be:

• constitutional provisions effectively guaranteeing political changeover at the various levels of power, limitation on the presidential term of office, effective separation of powers between the executive, the legislation and the judiciary.

• the need to entrust the electoral process to an independent commission which alone could guarantee:

• entering all voters on the electoral rolls;
• issuing voting cards to all registered voters;
• displaying electoral rolls and polling stations;
• supervising the voting process so as to avoid fraud and sundry irregularities;
• above all, votes for all.

Regarding public freedoms, the media will have to be used. The degree of media independence within a country enables an assessment to be made of the degree of public freedoms. For example, in Cameroon, the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, in collaboration with the CRETES, publishes an annual report on the media. Thanks to the backing of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, the Cameroon Union of Journalists has recently produced a publication on "infringements of press freedom in Cameroon". In the same context, we should mention the annual report by Reportères sans Frontières, and that by the Union of French-Language Journalists. Relevant information and indications drawn from these different studies permit an evaluation of the degree of media independence and therefore public freedoms.

Regarding the sound management of the nation (governance), this may be approached through certain instrumental variables, such as:

• Having an administrative structure (number of ministries and ministers) compatible with the level of economic development;

• The ability to direct programmes and projects. Improved structuring of administration, coupled with enhanced coordination of government action (council of ministers meeting regularly at fixed intervals, as in West Africa, government council, other coordination structures, notably for development aid) will inevitably result in coordinated, swift and effective decision-making.

• Optimal allocation of human resources and improved use of national capacities integrating all the country’s institutional and human capacities (private sector, association sector, consultants and various types of expertise) instead of merely government capacities;

• Reducing or eliminating corruption throughout the country. Nowadays, internationally recognised criteria mean countries can be compared according to the degree of corruption. Sound management of a nation is incompatible with a certain amount of corruption.

As to the European Union or the European donors, it is essential that they have a common attitude towards political obligations: Any potential EU sanctions against a country must not be blocked or side-stepped by a European bilateral partner for its own interests. Moreover, the EU must respect the principles of partnership founded on the concepts of equality, respect for sovereignty and mutual interest. It must pledge itself to discontinue any form of interventionism and paternalism observed in the past.

Similarly, the technical cooperation side of the partnership has been manipulated solely for the benefit of European consultants. What was once the exception to Article 275 of the Lomé Convention has become the rule. Contracts for studies and consultancy in the ACP countries have developed into the "private preserve" of European research departments which, through this intervention, supplant the local and sub-regional competencies that do exist. It is essential for the EU to undertake effectively to respect the provisions of Article 275 of the present Convention, regarding the improvement of skills in ACP countries.

Regarding aid coordination, it is important that donors set their actions within the framework of the structures that already exist, because this is not always done. One reason is that the cooperation policies of the EU countries are not sufficiently coordinated. On the ground, their actions often compete rather than supplement each other. This raises the awkward issue of leadership among the donors, particularly the most important among them, because everyone aspires to the leading role. The EU should undertake to ensure that its Member States effectively coordinate their cooperation policies and do not create campaigns running parallel to those underway or already existing in ACP countries.

The Lomé Conventions have primarily supported trade in primary materials through Stabex and Sysmin. The EU and the ACP’s European development partners must undertake to change this thrust: a) by reinforcing the competitiveness of businesses through support services in the areas of innovation, technology acquisition, reforming and restructuring businesses, competition culture and export techniques; b) by delivering an appropriate solution to the difficult problem of financing for SMEs and SMIs; this should be through adjustments to the arrangements for interventions by the EIB and the ILC; c) by reinforcing the productive basis through diversification and increasing local added value. This assumes investments in infrastructure, communications, energy, water control and environmental preservation.

The EU's commitment, aimed at securing some degree of reciprocity in decision-making at the partnership level, must likewise address the difficult question of indebtedness in certain ACP countries. Without an appropriate plan to reduce, eliminate or suspend debt repayments, African states cannot guarantee their basic functions (education, health, justice, security). This plan might include the following elements: a) simple writing-off of the debts of the most disadvantaged countries; b) converting the entire debt into controlled investments concentrating on diversification of the economies; c) temporarily suspending debt servicing so as to stimulate a growth dynamic.