Political Parties and Re-Democratisation in Latin America
Manuel Antonio Garretón

(Full Text of ECDPM Working Paper Number 34, June 1997)

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This paper should be cited as:
Garretón, M.A. 1997. Political Parties and Re-Democratisation in Latin America. (ECDPM Working Paper No. 34).
Maastricht: ECDPM.

Contents

•  Summary
•  Political Democratisation and Social Change
•  The Nature and Dynamics of Transitions to Democracy
•  Transformation of Social Actors
•  Parties and Political Representation
•  Lessons from the Experience of Foreign Support for Political Democratisation
•  Options for Future Foreign Support for Democracy

Summary

Political Democratisation and Social Change

The Meaning of Political Democratisation

a) A first type corresponds to democratic foundations which originate in the fight against oligarchic or traditional, sometimes patrimonial, dictatorships and where democratic transitions follow revolutions or periods of civil war (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti and most of Central America).

b) A second type of democratisation is what can properly be called transition. It refers to passages from modern authoritarian regimes, especially military, to democratic formulas that are not characterised by revolution, but where some kind of rupture had occurred. This happened in all the countries with modern institutional military regimes, so called "bureaucratic authoritarian", "new authoritarian", or "national security" regimes (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and specifically concerning the type of transition seen in Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru as well).

c) A third type of political democratisation refers to cases in which, without a formal moment of regime change or inauguration, there is a process of democratic extension or deepening coming from a semi-democratic regime. This process implies institutional transformation oriented either towards incorporating sectors that were previously excluded, constituting a real competitive or multi-party system, eliminating obstacles to popular will, or combinations of some or all of these - Mexico, Colombia).

While one alone of these three types of experience (foundational, transitional or through extension) may be the defining factor in a particular county's historical process, elements of all three types exist in every case.

In so far as we are dealing with incomplete political democratisation, consolidation of democracy overlaps with the deepening process. In many cases, we are in the paradoxical situation of democratically incomplete but consolidated regimes, in the sense that there is no risk of authoritarian backlash.

Unlike democratic foundations based on civilian wars, revolution and consequently global social change, transitions and extensions are strictly political processes, even if they have causes and effects in other dimensions of society. This is new in Latin American politics which are traditionally characterised by very widespread ideological projects that encompass all dimensions of society.

This limitation of the political sphere is one of the results of the learning process undergone by the whole of a society during transition, in which gradualness and negotiation play a crucial role. But it is also the factor that explains the frustration and disenchantment of people who think that nothing has changed. Let us remember that the traditional democratic ethos in Latin America was based more on equality and on what was called "substantive democracy" than on liberal values or electoral mechanisms that in many cases were not credible. That ethos along with the perceived socio-economic deterioration during the "lost decade" placed a heavy burden of responsibility on new democratic processes in terms of the recovery of standards of living and social development.

Democratisation and Society Change

But this limitation of political democratisation to one sector of society does not deny that even with its own dynamic and autonomy it is part of a very profound social change without which it is not understandable. We are not talking of what some ideologues call the transition to a market economy but of the end of an era or type of society in which authoritarianism and military regimes ruptured or ended.

We have characterised this transformation as the disarticulation and possible re-composition or re-foundation of what we can call the "socio-political matrix". This refers to the way in which social actors constitute themselves in a given society and to the kind of relations between state and society. More specifically, a socio-political matrix defines the relations between the state, the system of representation and the socio-economic and cultural basis of social actors. The institutional mediation between these three components is the political regime.

Since the end of the authoritarian and military regimes of the sixties and seventies, we have seen the end of what we have called the classic or politically centred matrix which is called by other authors as "state-centred matrix" or "national-popular" or "populist" period. This socio-political model was characterised by:

• some kind of fusion among the components of the matrix (state, political representation and social actors) and the consequent lack of autonomy of each;
• the weakness of institutions and hybrid political regimes (that is, combinations of authoritarian and democratic elements);
• overlapping of modernising, pro-development and nationalistic principles altogether with an internal market-oriented industrialisation and a central role of the state;
• middle-class leadership and intense popular mobilisation whose axis was politics.

In fact, the advent of military regimes was not the only deciding factor in ending the type of relation between state and society that characterised the post-oligarchic era (from the twenties on) in Latin America.

Equally important in the seventies and eighties were the processes of globalisation and world economic transformation that affected the place of Latin America in the world economy, criticisms on the prevailing model of modernity, and, most of all, the learning process of political and social actors that were structurally and culturally affected by those phenomena.

All of these converted democratisation into a polyvalent and multi-sense phenomenon, meaning that democratisation processes were not only the final consecration of democracy as an independent goal in itself, but were also part and vehicle of the transformation of Latin American society. The rebuilding of a development model with new relations between economy and state, the reinforcement of social integration and democratisation, and the re-definition of a model of modernity combining transnationalisation and identity for each society, while all tasks that remain to be done, need stable political democracies in order to be carried out. In fact, these democracies will not survive in the long term without the achievement of these tasks.

What Kind of Democracy?

As we have said, military regimes of the sixties and after were faced with globalisation and structural adjustments and they imposed a more market-oriented and open economy and a reduced role for the state in the economy. This generated the crisis and decomposition of the previous socio-political model. In every case, this was accompanied by an increase of poverty and social inequalities and by the disarticulation of the classic forms of collective action and the protection mechanisms for vulnerable sectors.

This decomposition means that we are not facing a new consolidated socio-political model. Rather we are dealing with different processes that include decomposition, maintenance of old elements, attempts to reconstruct the same matrix or to construct new models. These complex processes tend towards four different outcomes. The first is pure decomposition without a new pattern of social action (as was the case of Peru at the end of the eighties and beginning of nineties). The second is regression to more classical approaches (as was attempted by the left in Brazil and Mexico at the beginning of nineties). The third is a new matrix based on the autonomy, strength and complementarity of its components (this could be a possible outcome in Chile). Finally, there is co-existence of the first three in a sphere or region, without a common national pattern (this is the more probable outcome).

The results of these combinations are different for each country and it is too early to predict results. We will return to this in order to discuss how these concepts can be used to strengthen political democratisation.

Some years ago, after transitions, the question was what kind of democracy would be created in Latin America. Several authors have tried to describe the emerging types of democracies resulting from transitions. Most were characterised as "low intensity", "incomplete" or "weak."

We shall avoid a detailed discussion, and simply say that we are dealing here with two different, although related, questions.

a) The first strictly concerns the kind and quality of democracies emerging from post-authoritarian or military rule after transition. What can be said is that formal military or authoritarian regimes ended and are unlikely to return.

On the other hand, new democracies after transition are often incomplete because of the presence of authoritarian enclaves or legacies from the former regime (as in Chile). In other countries, partial regressions occurred (Peru) and in others, unstable democratic formulae without consolidation were replaced by "situations" with both democratic and authoritarian elements (Mexico, Colombia).

b) The second question, notwithstanding the important remaining transition and consolidation problems and combined with them, is that the main challenges that will define the future of democracy in Latin America concern its relevance, deepening and quality.

Deepening refers to the extension of mechanisms and, above all, ethical principles of democracy to other spheres of social life (regional, local, gender and labour relations, ethnicity). Relevance refers to the capacity of the regime to cope with its specific tasks (government, citizenship, conflict resolution) without relying on de facto powers. Quality refers to citizen participation, representation and satisfaction with decision-making, at local, regional and national levels.

The Nature and Dynamics of Transitions to Democracy

The Balance of Authoritarian Regimes

A rough balance shows that all these regimes were able to dismantle the insurrectional or politically mobilised social sectors. On the other hand, they failed in eliminating the political forces and, except in Chile, in generating a new economic model. In short, unable to establish a new socio-political matrix, these regimes were successful in disarticulating the previous relation between state, party system and social actors.

The Dynamics of Transitions

The main characteristic of transitions is that there is no overthrow or total collapse of the military regime, meaning that the latter will have some kind of presence or projection both in the transition process and in the new democracy. Two kinds of factors interplay in the initiation of transitions. One is the incapacity of dictatorships to establish permanent and legitimate authoritarian regimes. This has led them to some kind of "opening" that appealed to democratic principles (plebiscites, elections, constitutional changes). From the concrete case of the Brazilian military, which created a limited government-opposition party system, to the Uruguayan and Chilean plebiscites, there has, in all cases, been some kind of transition "from above".

But the other factor present in every case are the social and political mobilisation "from below" that forced or reinforced the openings from above. In general, the more this mobilisation was "social" the more it contributed to the regime's fall yet the less it pushed forward the transition. The more politically-oriented mobilisation was, the more its forces conceded and negotiated but at the same time the more the authoritarian powers were obliged to concede and to negotiate their withdrawal.

In this sense, these transitions were always preceded by some combination of negotiation and mobilisation. But these two components could not have interacted and transformed social mobilisation and demands into politically relevant forces for democracy without institutional frameworks where the continuity or end of a regime could be defined.

There is no transition to democracy without this triple game of negotiation, popular mobilisation and institutional framework. According to the weight and nature of these elements, each case is more or less closer to the typical transition paradigm or to more hybrid formulae that combine this paradigm with collapse or democratic foundation or extension.

Two consequences can be drawn from these features. First, there is no military defeat for power holders, but some kind of political defeat. The capacity of manoeuvre and the influence of military institutions to preserve their prerogatives in the new democracy largely depend on the seriousness of this defeat and on the nature and origin of the institutional framework. Second, in almost all cases we are dealing with incomplete transitions, that is, regimes that are basically democratic but share some patterns of the authoritarian ones, what we have called "authoritarian enclaves".

Thus, the task of the first elected post-authoritarian governments is double. One is to complete the transition overcoming the authoritarian enclaves. The other is to initiate consolidation processes that go beyond the first task. This second mission raises some problems for the unity of the democratic block, because there is a tendency (with the Chilean exception) to create a division between the people who administer the remains of the transition and those who administer the social demands and pass the bill.

Different Paths to Democracy

Democratic foundations and extensions have some particularities concerning the paradigm of transitions described above.

In the case of foundations, closest to a revolutionary or civil war model, it is more difficult to pass to a democratic regime where government and opposition must recognise each other as adversaries and not as enemies. Negotiations here take the form of agreements to end the war and usually need external mediation (the Contadora Group for example). Transition to democratic forms is very slow and revolutionary governments or the first government after civil war play the role of "transitional or provisional government", a role that does not exist in the typical transition paradigm. Revolutionary or fighting forces must suffer a complex metamorphosis to become political parties, as the Nicaraguan and El Salvador cases illustrate.

In turn, processes involving democratic extensions that are initiated by the regime or governmental parties imply some continuity where changing or retaining power are concerned. Usually, the economic model reorientation and structural adjustments provoke transformations that do not find a political system adequate to cope with it. This aggravates the government crisis (as in the case of Mexico).

Transformation of Social Actors

From the National Popular to the Democratic Movement

The reference to the state and links with politics change dramatically for social movements during the authoritarian regime. They become more symbolic, autonomous, self-referential and identity-oriented rather than being directed towards concrete demands or instrumental action. Instead of organised movements, the main collective actions were mobilisations that strengthened the symbolic and moral dimension, as shown by the leadership of the Human Rights Movement. When the opposition to military regimes demand the end of the regime and its replacement by a democratic one, then the more instrumental dimension appears through an institutional formula that involves all the previous expressions of collective action, as is illustrated in the Brazilian movement for "direct elections now".

There is in this way a turning away from national popular issues towards democratic ones, that is towards a unifying principle that for the first time refers specifically to the change in the political regime and not to radical and global social change.

With this, the social movement wins in strategic terms, but a price is paid because of the subordination of social demands to political goals. In turn this gives the leadership to political actors.

New Social Actors

In this double dimension a very important role is played by two kind of organisations.

a) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are specially important in the reconstruction of the social fabric as far as they link democratic professional, political, religious, and technocratic élites with the grass roots, at a moment when society has become atomised by repression and economic transformation.

Four main roles are played by NGOs. First, they give material support and organisational space to repressed militants and poor people. Second, they link social grass-roots with broad political, human rights and religious institutions, both national and international, through a band of activists belonging to both social and political sectors, thus making them a place of greater militancy than parties could be. Third, at least some of them provide knowledge about what is happening in society and the main ideas for social and political transformation, acting both as think-tanks and public opinion leaders. Fourth, and as a consequence of the former roles, they represent continuity for the opposition during the different phases of transition.

b) The churches, specially the Catholic Church and to a lesser extent the Protestant, played a crucial role in four aspects, even when in some countries like Argentina the official hierarchy supported the military regime. First, the Church can encompass diverse sensibilities, ideologies and visions and unify them in the human rights or right to life doctrines. Second, because of its claim to universality, or in the name of society or God, the Church can legitimately confront a military regime. Third, the Church provides an ideological, social and political space for its own followers and militants as well as physical and organisational space and institutional protection for all the other sectors of the opposition, thus creating possibilities for negotiations. Fourth, as a consequence of what has been mentioned, the Church is a space for gathering different sectors of the opposition, and an actor in its own right, capable both of opposing and being the interlocutor of the authoritarian regime. Here lie the strength and the weakness of this kind of intervention.

c) But it is necessary to avoid a naive or too optimistic vision of the relations between NGOs, church and political actors in their opposition to authoritarian regimes. In fact, because NGOs and churches were also channels of symbolic and material resources for the political opposition, they had a tendency to substitute social and political actors and to promote their own particular interests. On the other hand, NGOs and the churches tended to radicalise social and political action, disregarding the institutional framework and the viability of the ending of the military regime. In turn, parties were not always able to avoid manipulation of those organisations and tended to discard actions that could impede immediate political gains. So a very complex process of mutual understanding and learning took a long time. In this process the role of external actors was crucial as well as, paradoxically, the space provided by the institutional margins of the regime where these three types of internal opposition actors could meet, discuss, compete, and formulate partial and gradual consensus.

Collective Action in Post-transition Period

During transitions and consolidation periods, élite negotiations and transactions tend to replace social mobilisation. In other words, the political democratisation process tends to divide collective action into two types that involve all the actors.

One is the political-statist type oriented to the establishment of a consolidated democracy as a condition for any other kind of demand. The other is the particular logic of each movement oriented towards concrete benefits as a condition to actively support the new regime.

The presence of authoritarian enclaves after the inauguration of democracy maintained the importance of democratic movements at the beginning. But these were severely limited by some of these enclaves and especially by the risk of an authoritarian regression. This gave crucial roles to political actors, government and opposition, thus subordinating other social actors to their own logic. The tasks related to consolidation at the beginning privileged the necessities and requirements of adjustment and economic stability, reducing incentives for collective action that supposedly put in danger the precarious stability of the new regime.

Moreover, structural and cultural transformations that change the constitutive basis of classic actors generated some autonomy for diverse dimensions that were formerly subordinated to politics. In many cases, collective action tended to defend former gains challenged by the new economic model. In other cases, their momentum under authoritarianism was when they became alternatives to political expressions. In these cases they were able to put new issues like gender, religious or ethnic or regional identities, the environment, citizen security, informal or popular economy onto the public agenda. But when democracy came, the result was not the emergence or consolidation of new autonomous movements with political representation. All of this meant a general level of disarticulation of large social movements.

The Future of Collective Action and Social Actors

The main problem is that the inauguration of democratic regimes leaves social actors without a central principle of unification and projection beyond defensive actions against socio-economic and cultural transformations.

There are at least three problems hindering the emergence of new actors unified around a central principle.

First, is the increase in poverty and a new type of exclusion. This is characterised by marginalisation and internal fragmentation of "outsiders" that do not have, as in the past, ideological and organisational resources to mobilise. As this kind of exclusion penetrates all sectors and categories, coherent and stable collective action is almost impossible.

Second, as we have said, in the old socio-political matrix, diverse problems and dimensions were fused in a political system of mobilisation (state, party system, populist movements). In the emergent socio-political model the dimensions of social action will become more autonomous and politics will be more restricted. So it is not clear what or who will play the crucial role in the constitution of social actors, as was done by politics and parties in the past or NGOs and churches during authoritarian regimes. At the same time, there is greater diversity and a proliferation of social identities, together with a weakening of links that could unify this diversity.

Third, the egalitarian, libertarian and nationalistic principles of social action that prevailed in the national popular matrix, tend to become more complex, autonomous and technical. Moreover, changes in society have brought about new issues and principles that can be formulated as subjectivation, self-fulfilment or, simply "quality of life". Issues like environment, gender, identity, security, social recognition, local, regional and age sub-cultures, and so on, refer to the model of modernity and cannot be subsumed in the old types of collective action, struggles and organisations, such as unions or parties.

Thus, on one hand, social demand tends to diversify which means that it is no longer possible to respond with general politics that do not take account of needs perceived by the subjects. On the other hand, this demand is no longer only the search for access to different goods and services but also for quality and attention to social diversity.

What is foreseeable is a variety of forms of struggle and mobilisation that would be partial and institutional rather than wide and global - oriented more towards gradual modernisation, democratisation and social integration, than to radical objectives. Its contents would be divided between demands for inclusion and the search for meaning and identity facing the transnational model of modernity. In the absence of satisfaction of these demands, especially the ones referring to social inclusion and overcoming poverty, in the place of coherent and stable revolutionary movements, we will most probably see some abrupt and punctual explosions or individual or communitarian withdrawals or a combination of all these.

Parties and Political Representation

Party System in Latin America

A new socio-political matrix implies a significant transformation of the meaning and forms of politics. The model of action characterised by the absorbent centrality of politics, ideology and confrontational style is coming to an end. What is to be seen is whether a socio-political model of institutionalised negotiation, arrangements and competition can be constructed; whether democratic regimes would be relevant for channelling demands and conflicts, and whether states, parties and civil society will be able to remain autonomous yet complementary. More than authoritarian regression, the big risk is the irrelevance of democracy facing de facto powers and the decomposition of state institutions and collective action structures.

Let us remember that political party systems in Latin America were built on specific cleavages or were based on inclusive machines that did not represent the crucial cleavages in each society or were composed by parties that attempted to represent the entire society thus excluding pluralism. What predominated was a general vision that assumed that parties represented the unique and permanent cleavages or contradictions of society and that the resolution of one principal contradiction would solve all the other problems of society. In the sixties, when inclusive party machines lost their appeal, the messianic or revolutionary vision crossed all the parties, causing them to identify their own ideas and interests with the national ones. In a situation without institutional incentives for majority coalitions, the ideal was not to win a competition but to absorb or eliminate the opponent. To be the bearer of an absolute truth led the parties to organise in such a way that they stressed heroic militancy, replacing representation by invocation and democratic internal leadership by authoritarian forms like factionalism and personalism.

Party political ideologies varied across Latin America. But even in the case of less ideological parties, in some cases strong levels of inherited party identification tended to prevent them from becoming simply "catch-all" electoral machines. In other countries, the overlapping programmatic orientations of the parties in the absence of hereditary party identifications have helped make them more similar to the European "catch-all" parties.

In general, where party systems had been consolidated in electoral systems prior to mass incorporation in social life, they tended to become important intermediaries between civil society and the State.

Parties and Political Democratisation: a Learning Process

The transition to democracy marked the resurrection of parties after the long period in which authoritarianism condemned them to persecution, clandestine action or irrelevance. As far as we dealt with negotiated transitions, the main interlocutors from the democratic block were the parties. This fact and the opposition or governmental tasks in the new democracies provided for significant changes. On one hand, the political class went through a collective, though uneven, learning process on issues like the nature of dictatorship and ways of ending it institutionally. On the other hand, learning to live with the views of others, the basis, in other words, for a real party system, did not fully take place. This especially happens where a one-party or a bi-partisan system does not take account of the whole of society. Thus, partial or radical renovation, lesser ideologies, more interaction among existing parties and the emergence of new parties, completing the spectrum are the major developments occurring under dictatorship and transition.

In countries where the political class has been slow to learn, the cost has been tragic, with an important segment of the political spectrum practically disappearing. This has happened precisely where the chances of authoritarian regression have been highest.

The passing from old to new socio-political models, accelerated by the social and cultural changes already mentioned, goes beyond the classic authoritarian-democratic cycle in Latin America and raises serious challenges for representation and party systems.

On one hand, new demands on traditional political activity developed by parties emerge from the polity. New social cleavages and contradictions are superimposed on or, in some cases, replace the old ones. Party systems created on the basis of old cleavages are forced to incorporate new ones, either through existing parties or through new political organisations. As both possible processes are very slow, these new contradictions do not find their best representation in party systems and thus look for other types of expression.

On the other hand, politics has changed its forms and styles replacing the former political culture where all problems were mere reflexes of one single contradiction. This means that each party must have a particular proposal for each of the dimensions of the historical problems of the society (political and social democracy, international reinsertion and development models, pattern of modernity) and cannot subordinate one of these to another or to a general common proposal. And obviously among these different dimensions there are many tensions and contradictions that cannot be hidden by a global or revolutionary ideology.

The Reconstruction of the Party System

It is necessary to remember that the current party problems vary across countries. In some, the crucial problem is the construction of solid parties that meet the minimum criteria of what a party is in terms of representation, appeal, and capacity to govern, to oppose, and to make alliances. In the situation where parties really do not exist as such, it is highly probable that issues and actors will either have no representation at all or will be represented spuriously by media or show business personalities or by specific lobbies with social influence.

The Peruvian, and to a certain degree the Brazilian, case illustrates the situation where the creation of parties is still a necessity. In other situations, parties exist but there is no party system capable of representing the entire ideological spectrum or the different social sectors. This may be the case of one-party situations (Mexico until the last decade), bi-partisan situations with or without any hegemonic party (Argentina and Colombia, Mexico today) and cases where some sectors are organising themselves politically after guerrilla or civilian war (Central America) or new forces are integrating as a third party (Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina). Finally there is a situation where parties and party systems are consolidated in the sense that there are no new parties and that existing ones interact, but the problem is the rebuilding of linkages with constituencies, public opinion and society. This seems to be the Chilean case.

But there are more general problems that affect all party system independently of the situations mentioned above.

The first concerns the institutionalisation of representative and public debate functions which today are very weak. Parties are privileged spaces for mobilising and for elaborating proposals and projects; for representing social aggregate or transsectoral demands; for conducting government and opposition; for recruiting for political posts in government and parliament. None of these functions can be fulfilled without legislation that legitimizes, finances and socially controls parties and the party system. Public and equitable financing should be provided for campaigns and electoral processes, in particular for the debate and proposal functions, which implies research, intellectual elaboration and civic education.

The second has to do with the government function. The main problem today is that it is no longer possible to foresee strong governments based on single party support due both to fragmentation of political forces and the diversification of spheres in society. This means that the question of party coalitions to ensure majority governments is crucial. The discussions on presidential and parliamentary types of governments must be put in this perspective of institutional mechanisms to motivate coalition governments.

The third problem is the representation of new social cleavages and contradictions. On one hand, an effective party system appears to require parties that effectively reach out to broad sectors of the population, preferably relying on a mix of appeals. On the other hand, in order for parties to represent social conflicts and demands effectively and not become irrelevant, it is necessary to create institutional space where parties and other kind of actors meet to elaborate the public agenda at different levels (local, regional, national).

The fourth problem deals with the new forms of party ideologies. Rather than what is commonly called a "decline" of ideology, we see a transformation from global ideological politics to a more programmatic one, and this is especially true concerning socialist and leftist parties. This creates a vacuum for more utopian and symbolic formulations that appeal to youth and culturally-oriented sectors.

We are passing from ideological to instrumental politics. This is positive because it means the abandonment of fanaticism and sectarianism, but it could also mean the abandonment of ethics and instead a preoccupation with "good society" replacing politics by manipulation of interests. The universal risk is corruption and not only of the economic kind. A vicious circle could emerge: this type of politics creates apathy and public discontent, which can be manipulated by personal and anti-democratic actions, leading to greater disillusionment and distrust of politics by the people.

In sum, traditional party politics are affected adversely by social change. On one hand, parties can no longer be the central or exclusive expression of collective action. On the other, the role of politics and political parties is enhanced because it is the chief way of articulating the diverse spheres of social life without destroying its autonomy. There is less space for highly ideologically, voluntaristic, or globalising politics. But there is also a social demand for politics to be meaningful. And this cannot be given by market forces, mass media, or individual and corporate interests.

Lessons from the Experience of Foreign Support for Political Democratisation

Models of Foreign Support and Political Collaboration.

Almost all important parties have been affiliated to some international organisation or federation of parties, usually defined along ideological lines and led by one or several European parties. Rightists organised around the liberal international union of parties, centrists around Christian Democrat International organisations, Socialists and Social democrats affiliated to Socialist International, and, some time ago, Communists organised around PCUS.

Again, certain European or North American parties, directly or through party foundations, have supported Latin American parties. Finally, independent European and North American foundations, some of them at the state level, other of more inter-governmental character, directly or indirectly through specific social projects, have supported the parties in the region. Because of the weak institutionalisation and the absence of regulations of foreign aid to political parties, it is very difficult to provide quantitative data on this matter.

Independently of their size and origin, it is possible to distinguish several different types - which often overlap - of traditional support from foreign parties and foundations to Latin American political parties.

One form is ideological and political support through international meetings, congresses, debates, journals, invitation to leaders and middle-rank leaders.

A second is political education of militants and activists and the technical education of leaders through seminars, schools, training, and support for parties' education and research centres.

A third is direct economic and ideological contributions to social constituencies of parties, especially rural and urban workers' unions and leaders. This last has created serious problems of competition and divisions among these movements.

A fourth is technical and financial aid to party electoral campaigns, activities, leaders, or to certain concrete projects. In some cases the financial aid has taken the form of joint ventures like foundations, endowments, or new institutions in the assisted country.

A fifth is support for persecuted, arrested, exiled or clandestine party leaders and militants.

It is not possible to make a simple evaluation of these different trends. On the positive side, the international experience has led to capacity-building for party élites, clearly visible duirng the democratisation process. In addition, traditional ideologies and parochial styles have been adapted to fit in with contemporary international trends while organizations have been strengthened.

The negative side is precisely that this adaptation has frequently been abrupt and opportunistic, forcing the parties to adopt some labels or positions in order to access external resources. There is also a tendency to form around the supporter or donor a kind of client-based clique.

Sometimes, international co-operation has increased the influence of a recipient and provoked artificial competition among parties inside a country. Overall, the benefits of this kind of international support have outweighed the hazards, however.

In general, we can say that the more pluralistic the source of support or resource (donors) and the more pluralistic the recipient (beneficiary), the more the recipient is likely to have sufficient capacity to negotiate and to stand independently from the donor. It is also true that the more restricted the source and the recipient, the more the recipient's capacity to address specific goals becomes vulnerable. What the experience shows is that both donor and recipient should combine pluralistic and ideologically oriented forms of collaboration and support in order to maximise its benefits.

International Support for Political Democratisation

During the authoritarian and democratisation waves in the last two decades, the activities and support of international political organisations focused on five main issues.

First, the strengthening of the humanitarian dimension and the feeling of solidarity with activists, militants and leaders either in their own countries or as guests in the foreign country. This includes the celebration of solidarity festivals and human rights tribunals.

Second, the ideological renovation of Latin American parties, specially concerning the valorisation of democracy, the development of institutional means for removing dictators in the case of leftist parties, and the need for negotiation with the left in the case of centrist parties, pushing all of them to agreements for democratic or anti-authoritarian coalitions.

Third, technical and financial support for mobilisations, elections, plebiscites, and participation in international electoral control systems.

Fourth, support for NGOs acting as think-tanks for the political class or as links with social grass-roots organizations.

Fifth, support for non-partisan national or international fora, round tables and cooperative research or activist centres that allowed different parties to meet, exchange and look for strategic agreements. This trend was developed both by European and North American foundations; in some cases the invitation was extended to civilian sectors on the right in order to create soft-liners who would support, or at least not oppose, the transitions.

The general evaluation of international political support at this period is largely positive. However, let us indicate at least three important problems that are not always addressed. First, the tendency of some foreign institutions to lend more support to organizations for their more prominent grass-roots activities than to strategic, long-lasting or sustainable actions (research, education, independent publications). Second, the creation at the élite level of client groups that block support for other groups or sector. Third, the difficulty for foreign supporters to understand the alliances that are needed in each country.

Options for Future Foreign Support for Democracy

Looking at the present and future situation, we can draw some conclusions as regards international political support. Beyond the particular ideological and political affinities, it would be convenient if international political support to parties in Latin America could concentrate on two main areas.

Support for a New Socio-political Matrix

The first area is the strengthening of the four components of what we called the socio-political matrix in order to increase their autonomy and complementarity.

This means that foreign political support must be oriented to activities and actors that in each country meet one or several of the following conditions:

• re-legitimation and reform of the state (constitutional reform, accountability and social control, judiciary reform, new relations between executive and legislative, decentralisation).
• reinforcement of the party system, to which we will refer in the next paragraph.
• reinforcement of social actors at different levels of society. Here the main problem is to avoid the tendency to support a single type of grass-roots actor, thereby creating a constituency, and the tendency to set up artificial institutions in order to compete for foreign aid.
• reforms of democratic regimes so as to increase participation and representation in the electoral system at different levels (local, regional, national)
Support for the Party System

• Strengthening the party system in each country, something which is more important than support for individual parties. This means at least two things. First, people must be educated about various institutional systems for financing and advancing parties (and coalitions between them), in order to promote these institutional and constitutional changes. Secondly, a place must be found for encouraging inter-partisan meetings at all levels (local, regional, national, militants, middle rank, leaders, activists).
• Support for national ideological renovation through funding and support for party centres and institutes, in terms of long-term investments for institutional political projects that increase the capacity and autonomy of parties.
• Technical support for parties in order for new proposals on new issues - on which their ideological grounding is weak - to be worked out.
• Support for organisations which are not directly dependent on a single party, but which have links with the political sphere and which can foster relations between politics and social and cultural spheres and relations between different political parties.

This means that support for parties and activities will not be uniform from country to country. In one, for example, support may be given to a single party, in another to a coalition, and in a third, to all parties. In some cases, support might be directed at an institution or social movement regardless of its party affiliation, or to an idea or project that it is not supported by any specific party, the aim being to promote the role of actors that can become the bearer of this demand.

All this supposes that, other than the strengthening of local and national political systems and actors, there is no general criterion that could direct foreign political support. Further, that the implementation of this criterion varies from country to country and depends on the assessment of the specific political problems in a given country. In turn this means that foreign political supporters must always have independent local advisers in any country where they operate.