Decentralised cooperation
Lessons from EU experiences under the Lomé Convention
Jean Bossuyt

(Paper prepared for the meeting of European Advisory Councils, Mallorca, 2-4 November 1995)

For related ECDPM publications

Contents

• Abstract
• The Concept of Decentralised Cooperation
• Old Wine in New Bottles?
• Decentralised Cooperation in Practice
• Changes Since the Mid-term Review
• Improving the Implementation of Decentralised Cooperation
• Bibliography

Post-independence strategies gave the state a lead role in managing development, often excluding other actors. During the 1980s, this centralist, top-down approach was challenged. Structural adjustment and democratisation processes created space for direct involvement of civil society actors. Institutional pluralism, participatory development and decentralisation became the new buzzwords. Against this background, the European Union (EU) introduced the concept of "decentralised cooperation" into the Lomé IV Convention. It allows a wide variety of partners outside central government to use Lomé resources, which in the past were the monopoly of central government agencies. NGO's in particular, moved to the forefront as the 'third institutional sector' along with the state and business.

This new approach to aid delivery has great potential. Direct support to civil society actors may bring development closer to the people, enhance local ownership and accountability. Actively involving local actors is often seen to be the best investment in "capacity development."

Progress in implementation, however, has been limited. There are strong political, bureaucratic and cultural resistances to decentralised cooperation. Neither central government, nor donors have much experience in working with civil society actors as equal partners -- rather than simply as beneficiaries or executing agencies. It is not clear what decentralised cooperation actually means and what makes it so different from traditional approaches. Implementation is hampered by a lack of appropriate dialogue structures (interfaces) and flexible procedures. The different actors involved still need to clarify their new roles in decentralised cooperation and to adapt their capacities accordingly.

Using the experience of the EU under the Lomé Convention, this paper introduces the concept of decentralised cooperation, its origin and constituent elements; it identifies some of the key factors that have hampered effective implementation; it summarises the main changes emerging from the recent mid-term review of the Lomé Convention. The final chapter draws some broader conclusions on how to improve the implementation of decentralised cooperation.

THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISED COOPERATION

Decentralised cooperation was one of the innovations of the fourth Lomé Convention signed in 1989 between the European Union (EU) and the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. It paved the way for economic, social and cultural organizations (other than central bureaucracies) to submit development projects and to obtain Lomé funding.

This innovation reflected the worldwide thrust towards political liberalisation, changing perceptions on the role of the state in development and a search for alternative channels of aid delivery. It was seen as a step towards greater involvement of the people directly concerned by development programmes and a tool for the creation of a democratic fabric. It also sought to promote the active involvement of the European civil society in development (i.e. North South partnerships between local authorities, private sector associations, trade unions, etc.).

Several factors led to the adoption of decentralised cooperation in Lomé IV:

• Political changes. The worldwide thrust towards political liberalisation of the 1980s challenged the state's monopoly on power and gave a boost to civil society. New conditionalities have emerged that link aid provision to the type and quality of government [Moore, 1993]. This, in turn, led to a renewed interest for decentralisation as a possible response to the financial crisis and lack of efficiency of the state apparatus [M'Bassi, 1995, Manor, 1995].

• Shifting views on the role of the state Chambers [1993] distinguishes three clusters of views. The neo-Fabian ideology of the 1970s gave the state a major direct role in development. The neo-liberal model was a creature of the 1980s. In recent years, a new paradigm has evolved, based on "putting people before things, and poor people first; development through a learning process rather than by blueprint; decentralisation, democracy and diversity to value local knowledge; participation and small group and community action; and open and effective communication and access." Decentralised cooperation proposes a practical application of this paradigm. In this new approach, the role of central government is no longer to dominate the development policy process, but to provide an enabling environment for a variety of relatively autonomous institutional actors" [Oluwu, 1992].
• Concern to get value for money. The need to enhance aid effectiveness led donor agencies to move away from exclusive partnerships with African bureaucracies, generally perceived to be "overdeveloped and unaccountable" [Fowler, 1991; see also Dia, 1993] and to embrace non-state actors as alternative channels of aid delivery. Decentralised cooperation was seen to offer major benefits. It would make it possible to reach out directly to the "primary actors" of development; to prevent a monopolistic and non-transparent use of resources and to build local capacity.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?

To what extent is decentralisation cooperation really a "new" approach, and how different is it from traditional modes of operation?

There are no easy answers to this question. Participation and decentralisation have been on the development agenda for quite some time. There is a long-standing tradition of cooperation with local NGO's and to a lesser extent, with local authorities. Furthermore, decentralised cooperation means different things to different people. Some see it as a merely another financing line for NGO's. Others argue that decentralised cooperation is about twinning or partnerships between decentralised public authorities (as in the French system). Others, including Commission officials, claim that the purpose of decentralised cooperation is not to finance a multitude of isolated projects, but to promote cooperation between different actors at local level. Field managers find it difficult to see the difference with the micro-projects scheme, introduced under Lomé I (1975-1980).

The problem is compounded by the very open-ended nature of decentralised cooperation, as promoted under the Convention. The Commission has always been reluctant to come up with clear principles, eligibility criteria and procedures, for decentralised cooperation. This was done partly to avoid conflict with the ACP states, partly to prevent rigidity in management. It was felt that new rules and regulations would reduce the scope for innovation, flexibility and country specific approaches.

Yet careful reading of official reports and statements, makes it possible to identify some distinctive basic features of decentralised cooperation programmes:

• Political agenda. Decentralised cooperation is not so much a new instrument as a different political approach to development cooperation. There are clear linkages with the idea of "participatory development" and the promotion of democracy and human rights; strengthening the organs of civil society is expected to gradually broaden participation of non-state actors in policy-making, both at local and national levels; and direct funding to a wide variety of associations may help to promote the formation of interest groups which can challenge monopolistic tendencies and poor state performance.

• Transfer of decision-making and management responsibilities. The bottom-line of decentralised cooperation is to support initiatives that originate directly from the local communities and associations. There is no longer room for top-down forms of participation, where "beneficiaries" or "target groups" are invited to implement development projects designed elsewhere. Decentralised cooperation aims at reducing the number of "intermediaries" in managing aid and to put an end to "la logique du développeur". Responsibility for programme identification and implementation is delegated to the lowest possible level (the principle of subsidiarity). The transfer of financial responsibilities to the local actors is seen as the cornerstone of decentralised cooperation. This is a major innovation within the Lomé framework. Central government agencies will no longer be able to interfere in the day-to-day management of decentralised operations (including sensitive issues such as tenders). This has led some cynics to argue that decentralised cooperation is an elegant way to devolve or spread corruption more evenly.

• Capacity Development. In decentralised cooperation, this is seen as both a means and an end. It make little sense to transfer management responsibilities in the absence of targeted capacity development programmes that enable local actors to assume their new roles. On the other hand, involving local actors through a process of "learning by doing" is often the best investment in capacity development; it helps to strengthen the capacity of civil society to formulate their own development priorities; and it may contribute to building strong intermediate organisations that can "voice" the needs of the poor.

• Linkage with national development policies. Decentralised cooperation does not mean opposition to government, but a search for complementarities. The purpose is not to shift support away from government to a myriad of local NGO's. The limits of the "go it alone" approach have been clearly evidenced in Mozambique where, in 1990, no less than 170 foreign NGO's were running programmes in complete isolation from the State -- in many cases, these "new missionaries" had divided the country into "mini-kingdoms" [Hanlon, 1991]. Decentralised cooperation under Lomé attempts to avoid these pitfalls. It emphasises cooperation rather than antagonism between central government and local actors. It wants to give a prominent role to local governments as a nexus between the central agencies, the donor community and the local actors (NGO's included).

• Different roles for northern partners. Decentralised cooperation is not another financing line for cooperation between northern associations (e.g. NGO's) and their southern counterparts. In contrast with the traditional NGO co-financing modalities, decentralised cooperation aims to directly fund a variety of local organisations. Alliance with a northern partner is still possible, but no longer a prerequisite to access funds. It is hoped that this will induce northern NGO's to reduce their heavy involvement in project execution and to take up other roles (e.g. capacity development of local partners, assistance in managing direct funding, lobbying and advocacy).

DECENTRALISED COOPERATION IN PRACTICE

A recent survey by the Commission, based on questionnaires completed by the Delegations, indicates that most decentralised cooperation programmes are still experimental in nature. In several ACP countries, political conditions are increasingly favourable to decentralised cooperation. This is particularly the case for countries involved in decentralisation processes. Promising efforts are made to disseminate information, to start a dialogue between state and civil society (e.g. Zimbabwe, Senegal) and to set up decentralised aid programmes (in some cases in close collaboration with local authorities).

On the whole, however, traditional approaches are still dominant. From the survey, it clearly appears that most decentralised cooperation programmes are not so different from classical micro-projects. Local actors are seldom involved in project identification, appraisal and selection. Programme management remains highly centralised. There is only limited delegation of financial authority. The mobilisation of EU decentralised partners has not really materialised.

This slow pace of implementation ought not be surprising. Time is needed to change top-down attitudes [Mukandala, 1992], to reduce levels of mutual mistrust and to agree upon new roles, management approaches and procedures. The main bottlenecks to effective implementation include:

Political, bureaucratic and cultural resistances in ACP states

Decentralised cooperation runs contrary to the centralist state view of cooperation, which characterised all previous Conventions. Old attitudes die hard. ACP State see little incentives to change this and to make provision in their indicative programmes for decentralised cooperation. Many governments are afraid to devolve responsibilities and thus to lose control over aid resources and related benefits. The hostility towards decentralising part of the aid budgets mirrors resistance to any form of political decentralisation. Research on the relation between African government and NGO's confirms this view: "the amount of space allowed to NGO's in any given country is determined first and foremost by political considerations, rather than by any calculation of the contribution of NGO's to social and economic development" [Bratton, 1989]. The lack of clear operational guidance does not offer an incentive for field managers to venture into decentralised cooperation. Furthermore, little progress will be achieved if civil society actors continue to see the state as the "enemy" or to compete with each other for donor funds and local popularity.

Conflicting views on the purpose of decentralised cooperation

Decentralised cooperation meant different things to different people. ACP governments in favour of the scheme tend to see it as a way to involve NGO's and other decentralised actors in the implementation of Lomé programmes. This reflects the fairly limited view that ACP states tend to have on the role of decentralised actors. Local NGO's, for instance, are invited to participate in the execution of poverty alleviation projects, aiming at mitigating the social cost of adjustment, not to discuss the adjustment programmes themselves. This approach is consistent with the wider decentralisation policies of most African states. The tendency for central governments has been to devolve its functions to the local level in order to improve implementation of projects -- to bring top- down development closer to the people [Mutahaba, 1989]. Not surprisingly, this narrow interpretation is questioned by decentralised actors. NGO's, for instance, increasingly want to be involved at the planning stage, when the country is setting its priorities. They reject the role of mere "subcontracting agencies", i.e. cheap delivery systems for the implementation of development programmes decided elsewhere. They argue that decentralised cooperation is not about funding, but access to joint decision- making.

Lack of adequate procedures

The nature of the Lomé Convention (a legal partnership agreement between the EU and ACP governments) offers little scope for a truly decentralised approach. Lomé IV procedures, for instance, reserve a key role at each stage of the project cycle for the National Authorising Officer (NAO), the official ACP representative in charge of EU aid. This cumbersome decision-making and management system is hard to reconcile with the autonomy of decentralised actors and bottom-up participatory activities. In addition to this, the new scheme was introduced without serious consideration of its institutional and managerial implications. People in the field were left with no clear indications on how to set up and to operate decentralised cooperation programmes. Many critical questions remain unanswered. What are the eligibility criteria and priority areas of intervention? How are appropriate partners identified and selected? How to set up a dialogue with decentralised actors? How is decentralised cooperation with prevailing EDF procedures? How to monitor this type of programme? How to involve central government in decentralised cooperation and what new capacities need to be developed, both in recipient countries and donor agencies to operate the new scheme?

Capacity problems

The different actors involved are poorly equipped to use this chapter of the Convention. This certainly holds true for civil society. Knowledge of the modalities of decentralised cooperation is extremely low. In January 1994, the Liaison Committee of Development NGO's to the EU and MWENGO (a Zimbabwe based NGO) organised a workshop on decentralised cooperation. Few of the African NGO's attending the meeting had any knowledge of the Lomé Convention. They find it difficult to find their way to the Delegation and to comply with EDF procedures. In some countries, governments and donor agencies are willing to decentralise, but they do not find a well structured and representative civil society that has the capacity to enter into new partnerships. Lack of information also prevents European decentralised actors from participating in the scheme. Central government agencies, from their side, have little experience and capacity for dealing with a variety of autonomous civil society actors. There are also capacity problems at the Commission side, particularly in the country Delegations. Managing decentralised cooperation is a time-consuming task. It requires specialist knowledge and skills, including with regard to participatory techniques, decentralised management and monitoring systems. All of this is not readily available in the understaffed Delegations.

CHANGES SINCE THE MID-TERM REVIEW

The mid-term review of Lomé IV has recently been concluded and a new financial protocol agreed upon. The future Convention will have a new section on decentralised cooperation, incorporating the main changes of the mid-term review of Lomé (see new text in annex).

From the outset of the negotiations, the EU expressed a keen interest to expand the opportunities and level of resources for this type of aid delivery. It was claimed that decentralised cooperation reflects the primary objectives of EU development cooperation (i.e. the promotion of democracy, participatory development and poverty alleviation).

The mandate of the EU seemed to concentrate on (i) creating space for upstream participation of decentralised actors in defining the next National Indicative Programme (NIP); (ii) to expand the funding opportunities for decentralised cooperation programmes in the NIP's, and (iii) to change the rules for decision-making and management (i.e. to review the role of the NAO in allocating Lomé resources).

This mandate has not fully materialised, partly as result of fierce opposition from ACP states against the idea of direct funding. This led to the following compromise:

• With a view of broadening participation in formulating future indicative programmes, a "Joint Declaration on the Consultation and Information of Agents of Development" was agreed upon. According to this Declaration, ACP States will endeavour to organize "exchanges of views" with decentralised actors and to provide "relevant information necessary for their participation in the implementation of the programmes." If needed, and resources are available, the Commission can provide financial support for this type of consultation and information exchange. Most decentralised actors, including the private sector, are likely to be dissatisfied with this timid attempt to democratize the policy dialogue on Lomé programming.

• Three funding modalities will be available in the new Convention. First, ACP states themselves can incorporate specific decentralised cooperation programmes in the NIP's. Second, decentralised actors can participate in the execution of government programmes included in the NIP. Third, and this is really new, ACP states can reserve a certain percentage of their NIP to finance a wide variety of decentralised activities, to be determined at a latter stage. The open-ended nature of this window may help to provide direct and flexible support to genuine local initiatives. The existence of such a specific "guichet" depends entirely on the goodwill of the ACP state involved. Here again, fierce defenders of decentralised cooperation might feel disappointed. They might have expected a stronger EU stance on this critical point, including the option of reducing the allocation of Lomé resources to those countries failing to put aside money for decentralised cooperation.

• The principles with regard to the role of national authorities have not been modified. ACP-EU cooperation support decentralised cooperation "within limits laid down by the ACP states concerned". This provision ought not be a problem in countries which are supportive of participation and decentralisation. It may help to ensure the necessary coherence between national development plans and local initiatives. But in countries facing poor governance conditions, it is a recipe for failure. It will make it very difficult to reach out to local populations and organisations.

IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALISED COOPERATION

Overcoming current constraints to effective implementation will, inevitably, be a slow process. Time is needed to move away from thirty years of centralised development cooperation. The way forward lies with practice, experimentation, learning by doing, risk-taking and critical feedback. This, in turn, may help to prevent donor-driven, blueprint approaches to decentralised cooperation.

In this final section, we draw broader conclusions on how to improve the implementation of decentralised cooperation -- some of which is equally relevant to bilateral agencies and northern NGO's.

1. Adopt country-specific approaches Decentralised cooperation is not done in a vacuum. Progress is likely to be influenced, to a very large extent, by the conditions prevailing in recipient countries. Each country will have to find its own way to implement decentralised cooperation; there is no room for standardized packages. Decentralised cooperation will be slow to materialise if the political and economic power remains highly centralised and civil society very fragmented. No amount of donor pressure is likely to rapidly change this. It is likely to gain momentum in countries that have a strong commitment to political decentralisation and a booming civil society. In countries carrying out an ambitious decentralisation policy, donor agencies and foreign NGO's will need to make some clear choices. What is the most appropriate "entry point" (i.e. partner) for providing support to local initiatives? How best to use the new opportunities created at district level? How to ensure coherence between local programmes and government decentralisation programmes?

Recent research in Uganda, to which the author was associated, indicates that different options are possible, each presenting strengths and weaknesses. Some donor agencies might prefer to fully support the political decentralisation process of the Ugandan government. This may lead them to provide (direct) financial and institutional support to district structures. The advantage of this approach is that the donor programme works within existing structures. It starts from the premise that district structures are there to stay (which is not the case with donor agencies and foreign NGO's). Supporting the emergence of a strong local framework for development planning and coordination may help to ensure domestic political and administrative accountability. Linking aid programmes to existing structures provides better chances for sustainability. This option also carries risks. Donor programmes can be trapped in local politics. The focus on official bodies (politicians and civil servants) may make it difficult to reach out to the bottom level and to ensure genuine participation. Other agencies (primarily northern NGO's) might decide to choose local communities and groups as the main "entry point." District authorities are not neglected but perceived in a rather functional way (i.e. as a potential resource to be tapped to ensure project implementation). This type of decentralised cooperation may facilitate a truly participatory approach and capacity-building of decentralised actors. But the problem here will be to 'scale up' toward the district structures. District authorities (lacking basic facilities, resources and appropriate salaries) are likely to resent parallel programmes, richly endowed with operational budgets, vehicles, topping-up salaries. This, in turn, may threaten the sustainability of the programmes.

These contrasting experiences also point to the need to adopt a comprehensive approach to supporting decentralisation.

2. Promote cooperation rather than competition Past development practice has been characterised by the paucity of institutional forms used to achieve development objectives. After a period of almost exclusive cooperation with central agencies, the danger is now to radically shift donor support to private actors (including NGO's).

This is not the best path to follow. Either-or approaches have no place in decentralised cooperation: "Development from below requires development from above, using combinations of hard and soft political power, tight and loose bureaucratic controls, and forms of centralisation and decentralisation, Above all, without mutual respect among levels of government, there can be no community empowerment" (Werlin, 1989].

Simply "rolling back the state" is no panacea. The long-running "state-versus-market" debate has lost much of its poignancy. Indiscriminate privatization and dismantling of the state is "as much an error as the earlier whole-cloth commitment to centralist-bureaucratic organization" [Wunsch, 1991; Boye, 1992]. Experience in East Asia highlights the critical role of a strong and efficient government [Ranis, 1989]. Links between democratisation and development remain haphazard [Healey, Ketley and Robinson, 1993; Ellis, 1995].

Developing countries that have been successful in pursuing growth and alleviating poverty are generally those "whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, probity, autonomy and competence at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit and nationally-determined development objectives" [Leftwich, 1994]. Moreover, the limitations of "civil society" actors as development agents, working outside national policy frameworks, are increasingly recognised [Ukpong, 1993]. Often, the division between state and civil society is not obvious [Mamdani, 1992]. Doubts have been raised as to their capacity to have significant impact on political reform [Fowler, 1991].

The message is clear. The polemics of centralised versus decentralised systems ought to be avoided. Government should not be put in a position that it feels threatened or at the losing end. It would be unwise for donor agencies simply to circumvent central government and to distribute aid resources randomly among a wide variety of decentralised actors. Both the relevance and sustainability of this type of activities may depend, to a large extent, on a supportive role of governments (e.g. financing of recurrent costs). Civil society institutions can complement the action of the state, but not replace it: "NGO's are not the answer when the state is weak [...]. NGO's should in fact strengthen the state by making it accountable to its own people by a process of strengthening civil society. A strong civil society invariably leads to a strong state and the opposite is true" [Chitega, 1994].

The challenge is rather to convince government that decentralised cooperation may help it to achieve the objectives of its structural adjustment programme, to help generate income, provide employment and offset the social cost of economic and institutional reform programmes [Laidler, 1994]. In a similar vein, it has been argued that "the rise in participation will be less threatening to the states that are strong and more institutionalized" [Van de Walle, 1994].

If levels of mutual distrust can be reduced, there is scope to establish new partnership between governments and decentralised actors [Farrington, 1993]. Donor agencies play a critical role in promoting this type of complementary linkages by providing adequate financial incentives.

3. Develop new institutional arrangements and procedures Decentralised cooperation cannot work in the absence of new institutional arrangements for dialogue, decision-making and implementation. This will require institutional creativity and innovation. A first priority is to develop both new "interfaces" (dialogue structures) between central government and decentralised actors. In several countries, this will have to be done from scratch. Thirty years of authoritarian rule have created a major gap between state and civil society, resulting in distrust of officialdom. There is a lack of shared norms and institutions with sufficient legitimacy so as to ensure adherence of civil society actors. A second priority is to put in place appropriate decision-making and implementation structures for decentralised operations. Management authority can, for instance, be delegated to "steering committees" (representing the different stakeholders, including central governments and donors), independent trust funds or private agencies.

There is equally need for efficient funding procedures, allowing for a quick response to grassroots initiatives. Finally, there will be little political and managerial support to transfer responsibilities (i.e. "to lose control") in the absence of efficient monitoring and evaluation systems. To the extent possible, these monitoring systems should be locally embedded.

4. Learn to work with local governments Empirical research in different regions of the developing world has demonstrated that a nonprofit sector, funded by external donors, is not a valid alternative to a public sector with domestic responsibility [Meyer, 1992; Batkin, 1992]. NGO's are not in a position to substitute for central government provision of basic services, nor is it their role. Local governments, placed in between NGO's and the central government, may provide a more appropriate institutional framework.

The climate seems ripe for increasing support to local governments. In many African countries, central government agencies are "opening up", while civil society actors are making efforts to "scale up". The local government system may offer a platform for democratic interaction, participation and the search for new partnerships between different actors.

Aid agencies have not been very good in providing support to the emergence of a viable local governance system. At best, they have provided some financial support, technical assistance and training to local authorities. At worst, donor agencies have simply ignored their potential role in development policy management. In recent years, new approaches have been advocated, including "short-term external assistance for recurrent financing" [Therkildsen and Semboja, 1992].

Northern NGO's will also need to reconsider their policies. For too long a time, they have tended to by-pass local authorities, and have often weakened the structures by recruiting their staff at higher salaries. NGO's need to work both on the "demand side" (i.e. helpg communities to be more productive and to demand better government services) but equally on the "supply side" -- working with line ministries and other authorities at both the provincial and local level to ensure that they have qualified manpower, funds and equipment to work effectively. Only in those few countries facing complete economic and political collapse should NGO's try to take on these functions themselves [Goyder, 1994].

5. Decentralising the "mind" of donor agencies This is relatively easy at the policy level, as decentralisation has become a rallying cry among donor agencies. Adopting a 'decentralised mind' is far more difficult at the managerial and institutional level. It implies a profound change in donor attitudes, management, procedures and organisation -- much alike the change central government agencies have to undergo. It will require changes in programme design and implementation, technical cooperation policies, division of responsibilities between field offices and headquarters and accountability systems. It may need a revision of the current project cycle, to adapt it to the participatory framework of decentralised cooperation. There is, for instance, no room for an army of external experts, called in to quickly elaborate a detailed programme document or to play a dominant role in implementation. Another critical issue is the accountability requirements. Pressures on donor agencies to justify the use of aid funds may lead them to move accountability "upwards" (i.e. towards their own constituencies) rather than "downwards" (i.e. towards local beneficiaries). This, in turn, may increase the administrative burden on local organisations, having to elaborate an endless stream of accounts and reports. A possible alternative is to make greater use of local accountability systems. Perhaps the most difficult change will be to adapt the "language" of development cooperation to the real world and values of decentralised actors.

6. Increase knowledge

Decentralisation and participation have become new fads among donor agencies. They are promoted almost as a panacea for improving aid effectiveness. This is a risky approach:
• Both concepts make assumptions about state and civil society which are neither justified nor even properly examined [de Kadt, Mars and White, 1992). There is, for instance, no guarantee that local policy-making will be more relevant, participatory and development- oriented than a centralised approach [Crook, 1991]. The 'politics of the belly' ('la politique du ventre') may find a stronger expression at local level. The recent proliferation of local NGO's in Africa is a signal. Their levels of legitimacy, capacity and accountability are extremely varied.
• Problems of capacity are likely to be even more pronounced at local level. Donor agencies are well-advised not to over-estimate the capacity of civil society actors to quickly assume a lead role or to absorb large amounts of money. It will be important to systematically adapt financial flows to recipient implementation capacities. Intermediary NGO's can play a key role in providing a link between donor agencies and local groups [Carroll, 1992].

• Decentralised cooperation is a highly political form of aid. Most donor agencies seem poorly equipped to deal with this political dimension. At best, there is a tendency to see 'local politics' as a general contextual element. At worst, use is made of an idealised view of community participation and solidarity (e.g. the myth of 'spontaneous combustion' of people and ideas at grassroots level). Additional research will be needed on the role of foreign aid and its potential impact on the internal dynamics of civic associations and their capacity to contribute to democratisation [Robinson, 1995].

• Efforts at micro-level will yield little benefit in the absence of a conducive policy framework at macro and meso level. Development from below requires development from above. Donor agencies that are serious about decentralisation need to careful analyse the limits of this strategy and to provide adequate support to other levels of government as well. Additional research could provide guidance on how this can be done effectively.

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